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INTRODUCTION 2
The development of endogenous growth theory has provided many new
insights into the sources of economic growth. The essence of the new
theory is that growth is a consequence of rational economic decisions.
[...] Consumers invest in education to develop human capital and in-
crease lifetime earning. Governments increase growth by providing pub-
lic inputs, [...] and enhancing educational opportunities. Through the
aggregation of these individual decisions the rate of growth becomes a
variable of choice, and hence a variable that can be affected by the tax
policies of governments.
Gareth D. Myles, (2009). Economic Growth and the Role of Taxation - Aggregate
Data. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 714.
There surely are strong reasons, in principle, to believe that policies
formulated for the provision of infrastructure and even human capital
that are sensitive to regional or local conditions are likely to be more
effective in encouraging economic development than centrally determined
policies that ignore these geographical differences.
Wallace E. Oates, (1993). Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Development. Na-
tional Tax Journal, volume 46, number 2.
This thesis is entitled “Fiscal policy and economic growth in the presence of
intergenerational transfers”. It is composed of four self-contained chapters1 and
focusses on the growth and welfare effects of taxation and public spending. The
baseline is to further investigate the two conjectures introduced above, namely how
various tax and spending policies affect economic growth when different forms of
intergenerational and intergovernmental transfers are present.
In the first and second chapter the implications of capital income taxation for
the growth process are discussed. The analysis emphasizes the role of public and
private intergenerational transfers in form of public pensions and bequests as well
1The first chapter is co-authored by my colleague Chrisitane Schuppert and has been published
in FinanzArchiv, see Kunze and Schuppert (2010) for further details. The second chapter is an
extended version of a paper that has been published in the Journal of Macroeconomics, see Kunze
(2010) for further details.
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as intergenerational redistribution induced by public policies. As will be explained
in further detail below, the presence or absence of such transfers may substantially
alter the results of the previous literature.
A more general and broader interpretation of the statement of Myles to include
not only private educational spending but also intergenerational transfers in form
of physical capital leads to the third chapter. The focus of the analysis is on social
security funding and its implications for economic growth. Whereas a pay-as-you-go
pension scheme, as considered in chapter one, naturally includes intergenerational
transfers from the current working generation to retirees, a fully funded social secu-
rity system does not. Still, the presence of such transfers within the economy turns
out to play a key role in determining the impact of funded social security on economic
growth and therefore allows to establish interesting new policy implications.
In order to further inspect Oates’ conjuncture that fiscal decentralization may be
beneficial to the growth process, the perspective in chapter four is again broadened
to encompass intergovernmental transfers between different levels of government in
addition to intergenerational transfers. While the traditional theoretical literature
on fiscal decentralization focusses mainly on efficiency issues, empirical evidence for
a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth turns
out to be mixed. Some studies can confirm the positive impact of higher degrees of
decentralization on economic growth, whereas others face difficulties in establishing a
positive relationship and, in fact, obtain either no dependency or a negative one. The
aim of the present chapter is therefore to further evaluate the theoretical linkage and,
at the same time, to give an explanation for the discrepancy between the empirical
literature.
The common denominator of all four chapters is that they incorporate an en-
dogenous growth process in an overlapping generations model to evaluate long-term
policy implications when different generations are affected in different ways by fiscal
policy. In this respect, the overlapping generations framework is perfectly suited
to analyze the impact of public policies related to intergenerational redistribution
on economic long-run growth as the economy’s development, in terms of growth, is
directly related to individuals’ optimizing behavior. Specifically, in case the model
includes capital accumulation, the growth path of the economy is to a large extend
determined by an agents’ saving decision. Similarly, if the model features human
capital accumulation as engine of growth, the optimal amount of resources devoted
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to public and private educational funding is all important. In any case, the decisive
mechanism of the overlapping generations model is the individual’s decision about
consumption smoothing over the life-cycle, namely the allocation of a given income
towards consumption when young and savings used for old-age consumption (and
also resources to be transferred to the own children). In order to obtain intuitive
and explicit results, and to keep the different models analytically tractable, produc-
tion functions are assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas type throughout this thesis
whereas utility functions are either CES or Cobb-Douglas. The aim of the present
thesis is therefore to point out how various tax policies impact on economic growth
and how such relationships may change depending on the presence of different types
of intergenerational transfers, and not to give a complete characterization in its most
general form. In this regard, each chapter of the present work highlights a differ-
ent channel through which the effects of taxation and public spending on economic
growth can be explored.
More specifically, the first chapter sets up a two period overlapping generations
model where endogenous growth is ensured by the existence of externalities be-
tween firms in form of learning-by-doing. These externalities support the view that
knowledge from a single firm instantly spreads across the whole economy and thus
enhances the aggregate stock of capital. Moreover, the model features unemploy-
ment and a social security system comprising pensions and unemployment benefits,
thereby capturing important institutional features of European economies. Given
this framework, the aim of the first chapter is to investigate the growth and welfare
effects of an increase of capital income taxes with additional revenue being devoted
to cut wage-related social security contributions to reduce unemployment. Conse-
quently, the analysis examines an alternative way of financing social security which,
in view of the looming crisis of these systems, is highly relevant and on top of the
agenda in most industrial countries. It is shown that such a reform not only pro-
motes employment but may additionally stimulate economic growth. Calibrating
the model to match data for the EU15 reveals that European countries can indeed
gain in form of higher employment growth and welfare if the initial capital income
tax is not too high.
The focus of the second chapter is still on capital income taxation but, in contrast
to the first chapter, intergenerational transfers take the form of private bequests
instead of public pensions. This introduces a novel channel through which capital
INTRODUCTION 5
income taxation may effect economic growth, namely private income redistribution
within the family as a response to public redistribution induced by the various
policy reforms. While in the first chapter it is shown that higher capital taxes can
have a growth-enhancing effect when combined with a revenue-compensating cut
in wage taxes, the present chapter demonstrates that this result critically hinges
on the non-existence of a bequest motive. The analysis reveals that a wage-tax
cut is no longer growth-enhancing when bequests are operative as individuals then
encounter any public redistribution resulting from shifts in the tax levels by adjusting
their own savings and bequests which unambiguously reduces growth. Moreover,
growth in this chapter is generated by productive government expenditures that
grow at an equal rate as the capital stock which allows to explicitly focus on the
interaction of the government’s revenue and expenditure side. More specifically, the
issue of spending composition when governments may decide on allocating a given
tax revenue towards alternative spending categories as well as an increase in the
capital income tax which is combined with an expansion of productivity-enhancing
public services and their implications for the growth process will be discussed. For
the latter case it turns out that a positive growth effect is still possible and becomes
even more likely compared to the case of inoperative bequests as it obtains under less
restrictive conditions. Finally, all theoretical findings are illustrated by numerical
simulations based on US data.
The third chapter introduces another aspect of fiscal policy in the presence of
intergenerational transfers, namely human capital transmission as a means of redis-
tributing resources across different generations. While such intergenerational trans-
fers have been modeled as either exclusively public (pensions) or private (bequests)
in the first and second chapter, the interplay of two types of transfers in form of
private investments into human capital and bequests within the family will be the
focus of the present chapter. The analysis aims at investigating the relationship be-
tween economic growth and a fully funded social security system in an overlapping
generations model with family altruism where private investment in human capital
of children is the engine of growth. In contrast to the first chapter, which studies an
alternative way of financing pay-as-you-go pension schemes, the focus is therefore
on the growth effects of an alternative social security system whose introduction has
been on top of the agenda in recent reform debates. It is shown that a funded pen-
sion scheme may harm growth if there are operative bequests within the family, and
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parents thus face a trade-off between educating their children and leaving bequests.
By contrast, when bequests are inoperative, the Ricardian equivalence holds and an
increase in forced savings is exactly offset by a reduction in private savings leaving
capital accumulation and educational spending unchanged. Moreover, an unfunded
pension scheme may bring about faster long-run growth than a fully funded one
when bequests are inoperative while the opposite is true when bequests are oper-
ative. These results contribute to the recent debate on reforming existing social
security systems.
Finally, the fourth chapter examines the effects that fiscal decentralization may
have on economic growth and welfare levels. Using a similar model setup as in chap-
ter three, namely when growth is driven by human capital accumulation which in
turn builds on public and private intergenerational transfers in form of educational
investments, growth and welfare maximizing levels of fiscal decentralization are de-
rived. The model setup features different levels of governments, namely local and
central governments. In contrast to the previous chapters, the central government
does not decide about a tax rate but instead on the amount of education subsidies
provided to local governments, which is interpreted as an indicator of the degree of
fiscal decentralization. The analysis reveals that there exists indeed a growth max-
imizing degree of fiscal decentralization which is increasing in the output elasticity
of human capital with respect to private educational spending. Consequently, the
more education rests on private resources the less should local educational spend-
ing be subsidized by the central government. Furthermore, it is shown that some
degree of fiscal decentralization is always superior (in terms of long-run growth and
welfare) to a system where either local or central governments exclusively finance
educational investments.
In summary, comparing the results obtained in the four chapters with those in
the related literature some general conclusions emerge: first, the impact of capital
income taxation on growth is not as clear cut as has been proposed by most previous
studies which claim a negative relationship, as capital income taxation reduces the
return to private investment and thus exerts a negative impact on the process of
capital accumulation. Rather, the presence of intergenerational transfers plays a
key role when assessing the impact of fiscal policy on economic growth. Whenever
individuals may counteract public redistribution induced by policy changes, this
may also overturn the implications of such changes for growth and welfare. Sec-
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ond, the analysis puts some caution on the conventional view that a fully funded
pension scheme is beneficial for (or at least neutral to) economic growth. Again,
the presence of intergenerational transfers turns out to be the critical factor in de-
termining the growth effects: when individuals face a trade-off between allocating
parts of their income towards educating their children or increasing their children’s
disposable income by leaving bequests, proportional mandatory contributions may
distort parents’ educational choices and therefore harm growth. Consequently, be-
sides the well known result that shifting from a pay-as-you-go pension system to a
funded one can, in general, not be established in Pareto improving way, our analysis
provides an additional argument against a too strong reliance on fully funded social
security. Third, the theoretical findings with respect to the relationship between
fiscal decentralization and economic growth can only partly confirm Oate’s conjec-
ture that fiscal decentralization is conducive to higher growth as a positive growth
effect only obtains if the initial degree of fiscal decentralization is sufficiently small.
Furthermore, the existence of a growth maximizing degree of fiscal decentralization
may not only explain the opposed empirical findings, but also points to the fact
that the theoretical linkage is not as clear cut as proposed by some previous studies.
These results may provide new insights into the field of economic theory as well as
influencing the relevant policy debates.
Part II
Chapters
8
Chapter 1
Capital taxation and social
security financing
1.1 Introduction
The combination of high unemployment rates and slow economic growth in most
European countries has lead to a re-examination of social security systems and trig-
gered efforts for possible alternatives of financing these systems. Empirical evidence
by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) and, more recently, by Planas et al. (2007) sug-
gests that a significant part of European unemployment can be traced back to a
steady rise in the costs of labour. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, for example, the
long-term movements of the two variables unemployment and effective labour tax
rate are globally upward sloped over the last 30 years, despite the fact that there
is a slight decrease in the slope since the mid eighties. Consequently, there exists
a direct link between wage-related social security contributions and unemployment.
Although unemployment rates have been declining in recent years, the continuous
rise in contribution rates resulting from population aging implies that the problem
is not only still relevant but will even become more important in the future as old
age dependency ratios are projected to increase from around 30 % at the moment
up to 60 % in 2050 in most European countries.
So far, several reform proposals to lower the wage tax have been discussed in the
literature. Yet, most existing studies focus on either environmental tax reforms (e.g.,
Wendner (2001); Ono (2005, 2007)) or the introduction of a consumption tax (e.g.,
Hu (1996); Lopez-Garcia (1996) and Lin and Tian (2003)) as alternative financing
9
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Figure 1.1: EU 12 Unemployment and Labour taxes (in %) over 1970-2002
Source: Planas et al. (2007), Figure 1.
instruments. In contrast, capital income taxation is generally not considered an
alternative. This is due to the fact that the literature dealing with optimal capital
income taxation, originated by Chamley (1986), generally finds it optimal not to
tax income from capital. Moreover, it seems to be apparent that a rise in capital
income taxes that reduces the rate of return to savings hinders any growth process
driven by capital accumulation. Yet, Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Caballé (1998)
derive potential positive growth effects related to a rise in capital income taxation.
This is due to a shift of the tax burden from the young generation to the old, giving
rise to positive saving and growth effects if the interest elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption is sufficiently small. Against this background capital
income taxation seems to provide a suitable alternative to wage-related social se-
curity contributions.1 However, both models feature full employment and discuss
taxes levied to finance a fixed public budget. Hence, it is not clear a priori whether
1Quite differently and in contrast with the empirical literature, Birk and Michaelis (2006)
develop a model in which the growth rate is independent of payroll taxes and conclude that a
reduction of the tax rate on capital financed by higher payroll taxes unambiguously promotes
growth.
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the derived growth effects survive in the presence unemployment and tax-financed
social security systems.
The present chapter examines possible positive growth effects of an increase of the
capital income tax used to cut wage-related social security contributions and thereby
increase employment. The issue is explored within an overlapping generations model
allowing for endogenous growth in the spirit of Romer (1986). To capture important
institutional features of European economies, a tax-financed social security system
comprising unemployment benefits and pensions is introduced. Moreover, labour
markets are imperfect and characterized by wage bargaining between unions and
firms generating equilibrium unemployment.
The results of the present model reveal that an increase of capital income taxa-
tion that lowers the wage tax not only reduces unemployment but can additionally
promote growth. Yet, whether growth is actually stimulated depends on the magni-
tude of the different, partly opposing effects on capital accumulation. Firstly, there
is a direct effect via the public budget inducing a decline of the wage tax. This
increases the net income of employed households and thereby promotes savings as
well as growth. Secondly, a higher tax on capital income raises the present value
of pensions, resulting in a disincentive to accumulate capital and, thus, in lower
growth. Thirdly, a rise in the capital income tax provokes the opposing income and
substitution effects, and, therefore, has an ambiguous impact on growth. Fourthly,
a decline in the wage tax reduces unemployment which in turn has an ambiguous
effect on growth as, on the one hand, the share of wage earners in the population
increases and thus also savings whereas, on the other hand, lower levels of unem-
ployment reduce efficiency and therefore current and future wages which in turn
lowers aggregate savings and growth.
Consequently, depending on the magnitude of the different effects, a policy reform
that increases capital income taxation to lower the labour income tax has the scope
to not only reduce unemployment but moreover to facilitate growth. To assess
the relevance of possible growth-enhancing effects, the model is calibrated to match
data from the EU15. The results imply the existence of a growth-maximizing capital
income tax rate that is clearly positive. Moreover, the calibrated model indicates
that increasing the capital income tax fosters growth if the initial level of capital
taxation is not excessively high.
Finally, the welfare effects of the tax reform are discussed. This is important as
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a reform that is not capable of generating a net welfare gain will most probably
lack political support. Extending the previous calibration exercise and focusing on
the range of tax rates where growth-enhancing effects occur, however, shows that
the reform will indeed generate a net welfare gain already in the first period: while
the old population and unemployed individuals clearly lose, the welfare gains of the
young and employed are high enough to compensate for these arising losses.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the model. Section
1.3 derives the growth effects of the revenue-neutral tax reform and discusses the
numerical results. Section 1.4 then turns to the welfare implication of the reform
and studies whether the reform can generate net welfare for the entire population.
Section 1.5 summarizes the results and concludes.
1.2 The model
Consider a closed economy with overlapping generations in the tradition of Diamond
(1965). It is assumed that the population size grows at the constant rate n =
Nt/Nt−1− 1. Labour markets are imperfect in the sense that unemployment results
from wage bargaining between unions and firms. Moreover, a social security system
ensures against the risk of unemployment and the risk of old age via unemployment
benefits and pensions. The basic model setup follows Bräuninger (2005) who studies
interrelations between unemployment, pensions and economic growth. This work is
extended by introducing capital taxation to explicitly analyze the impact of changes
in the taxation of capital income on the growth process.
1.2.1 Households
At each moment in time, the population consists of a large number Nt of young
individuals which either work or are unemployed and a large number Nt−1 of old
individuals which are retired from work. Each young individual inelastically supplies
one unit of labour. The fraction of working individuals is given by (1−ut)Nt, where
ut denotes the unemployment rate. When young, individuals work and receive
income It, which comprises net wage income if employed or unemployment benefits
if unemployed. This income is partly used for consumption in the current period ct
and partly saved for consumption during the retirement period dt+1. Consequently,
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the individual’s first period budget constraint is given by
It = ct + st. (1.1)
When retired, an individual earns interest income on savings, Rt+1st where Rt+1 =
(1+ (1− tr)rt+1) denotes the interest factor and t
r the tax on interest income which
constitutes an additional revenue instrument to finance social security. Moreover,
the individual receives a pension pwt+1
2. The second period budget can, thus, be
described as
dt+1 = (1 + (1− t
r)rt+1)st + pwt+1. (1.2)
Individuals have identical preferences, depending on consumption during the two
periods of life, ct and dt+1. These preferences are assumed to be described by a CES
utility function of the following form
U(ct, dt+1) =
c
1− 1
σ
t − 1
1− 1
σ
+ δ ·
d
1− 1
σ
t+1 − 1
1− 1
σ
. (1.3)
The parameter δ captures the individual’s discount rate and σ the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Maximizing the above utility function subject to the
budget constraints yields the individual savings function
st(Rt+1, σ) = ϑ(Rt+1, σ)It − θ(Rt+1, σ)pwt+1 (1.4)
where
ϑ(Rt+1, σ) =
(
1 + δσR1−σt+1
)−1
with
∂ϑ
∂Rt+1
=
(σ − 1)
δσRσt+1 · ϑ(Rt+1, σ)
2
R 0 (1.5)
and
θ(Rt+1, σ) =
(
δσRσt+1 +Rt+1
)−1
with
∂θ
∂Rt+1
= −
1 + σδσRσ−1t+1
θ(Rt+1, σ)2
< 0 (1.6)
2Clearly, it is assumed that the pension level in the retirement period depends on the wage
level of the retirement period. Despite the fact that in most countries pension benefits are related
to the wage in the (previous) working period, this assumption can be justified as homogeneous
individuals are considered and the model, thus, does not allow for different pensions resulting from
wage differentials due to skill differentials. Moreover, in most countries each year’s pension increase
is closely linked to the wage increase.
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Besides the straightforward dependence of individual savings on income It and the
pension ratio p, the interest factor Rt+1 affects individual savings via two channels.
Firstly, a decline in the interest factor, e.g. resulting from an increase in the capital
income tax, causes the income and substitution effects. Which of the two effects
dominates depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For σ > 1, the
substitution effect dominates and savings decline. For σ < 1, the income effect
prevails and individual savings increase. The effect of a declining interest factor
on savings is, therefore, ambiguous. Secondly, a lower interest factor raises the
present value of pensions. Since pensions and savings are perfect substitutes, this
pension effect discourages private capital accumulation and leads to crowding out
of individual savings.
1.2.2 Government
Next, consider the role of the public sector in providing a social security system that
comprises both unemployment insurance and pensions. To do so, the government
can resort to two fiscal instruments, a wage tax tw and a tax on capital income tr,
which finance unemployment benefits as well as the pay-as-you-go pension system.3
It is assumed that the contribution rates can be decided by the government, while
the replacement rate and the pension ratio are exogenously given. More precisely,
granted unemployment as well as retirement payments are fixed in proportion to
the gross wage with the replacement rate b < 1 and the pension ratio p < 1.
Consequently, a balanced public budget requires
twwt(1− ut)Nt + t
rrtKt = pwtNt−1 + bwtutNt, (1.7)
where pwtN−1 constitute aggregate expenditures on pensions for the old generation
and bwtutNt comprise unemployment benefits paid to the fraction of unemployed
individuals utNt. Kt denotes the current capital stock which is fully determined by
savings of the previous period. To focus on the role of revenue-neutral changes of
capital income taxation on growth, the budget constraint is rearranged to express
3Note that the pension scheme is modeled in a Bismarckian tradition in this paper; apart
from the capital income tax as a means of financing public expenditures, individuals’ pensions are
proportional to their contributions. In most countries, however, pension schemes also comprise
Beveridgean elements. In this case individuals receive uniform pension benefits, irrespective of
their contributions. Yet, the modeling here can be justified as individuals are assumed to be
homogenous and the analysis does not focus on the redistributive effects of pension systems.
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the wage tax tw as a function of the tax on capital income tr,
tw =
p+ but(1 + n)
(1− ut)(1 + n)
− trrt
Kt
wt(1− ut)Nt
. (1.8)
Equation (1.8) reveals that an increase in the tax on capital income leads to a
reduction of the wage tax. Moreover, a higher rate of unemployment requires more
payments on unemployment benefits and, thus, directly raises the wage tax.
1.2.3 Production
On the production side of the model, perfect competition between a large number
of identical firms is assumed. Given the factor inputs capital Kt and labour Lt, the
production technology can be described by a Cobb-Douglas production function of
the form Yt = AK
α
t (EtLt)
1−α with 0 < α < 1. The parameter A is a general index of
efficiency, while Et describes a labour efficiency index depending on the knowledge
of workers.
This labour efficiency index allows to model an endogenous growth process in
line with Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988): Assuming that knowledge is accumulated
in proportion to aggregate capital, the aggregate index of labour efficiency equals
Et = Kt/Lt. This implies that there exists a positive externality of the aggregate
stock of capital on the production process. Moreover, as will be explained in the
following subsection, unemployment occurs in every period with ut denoting the
proportion of unemployed individuals. It follows that the aggregate labor input can
be written as Lt = (1 − ut)Nt. The production technology thus simplifies to the
AK-type production function allowing for endogenous growth4,
Yt = AKt. (1.9)
In line with Frankel (1962) labour efficiency in the present setting is given by aggre-
gate knowledge per employed worker. This captures the idea of learning by doing
as an increase in the physical capital stock simultaneously enhances the aggregate
4A shortcoming of this modeling is, however, that efficiency is increasing with unemployment
which seems to be at odd with what can be observed. Still, this assumption ensures analytical
tractability in deriving the growth and welfare effects of the revenue neutral tax reform as the
interest rate and output turn out to be independent of unemployment (Corneo and Marquardt,
2000).
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stock of knowledge.
Firms maximize profits Πt = Yt − wtLt − rtKt, implying that the wage rate and
the interest rate have to equal the marginal revenue of the respective factor input,
wt =
∂Yt
∂Lt
=
(1− α)AKt
(1− ut)Nt
, (1.10)
rt =
∂Yt
∂Kt
= αA. (1.11)
Notice that output and the wage rate are proportional to capital and will grow at
the same rate in the steady state. In contrast, the interest rate is constant. An
increasing unemployment rate does neither affect output nor the interest rate, but
increases the wage rate.
1.2.4 Labour Market
Despite the fact that profits will vanish in a competitive market equilibrium, unions
can try to capture quasi rents by pushing up their wage demands: For a fixed amount
of capital employed by the firm, higher wage demands induce firms to increase the
marginal product of labour by lowering the level of employment. This raises the
wage rate employed workers receive and is, thus, in the interest of the union.
Following Layard et al. (1991), the wage bargaining process occurs at the firm
level with every firm being represented by a union l. Since all firms and unions are
identical, it suffices to consider the bargaining problem of a representative union.5
This representative union is interested in maximizing the aggregate utility of all
union members Nt, which amounts to maximizing the sum of expected income of
the young individuals6
Γt = Nt ((1− ut)(1− t
w)wt + utat) , (1.12)
5The firm index will be suppressed in the following.
6Note that this is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a risk neutral representative union
member, since it is implicitly assumed that layoffs are by random assignment and that there is
perfect foresight about the unemployment rate as well as the unemployment benefit, see Layard
et al. (1991). Furthermore, the trade union is formed by all individuals of the working generation,
implying that only the young of each period are union members. Thereby, the analysis follows the
common view of the literature that trade unions represent the interest of labour and consequently
seek to maximize the utility effects of the wage related components of lifetime income and neglect
effects via capital incomes. As unions are assumed to be small their effect on aggregate savings and
hence the interest rate and future wages will, in fact, be negligible. However, further elaboration
on this issue may be an interesting topic of future research projects.
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where (1− tw)wt denotes the net income when staying employed which might occur
with probability 1 − ut. The variable at describes the alternative income that will
be received in case the worker looses the job at this specific firm with probability ut.
This alternative income can be described by the weighted average at = φutbwt+(1−
φut)(1−t
w)wt, indicating that in the presence of periodical fluctuations on the labour
market, each employed worker faces a positive probability 1−φut of finding a job in
another, identical firm. With probability φut, the worker remains unemployed for
the current period and receives unemployment benefits. Moreover, the alternative
income is also what workers will receive in case the bargaining process fails, and
thus constitutes the threat point of the union, Γt = atNt. In contrast, firms intend
to maximize profits and face losses in form of the cost of capital Πt = −rtKt if
no solution is reached in the bargaining process. Given this setup, the bargaining
process can be described by the Nash-product,
Ωt =
(
Γt − Γt
)γ (
Πt − Πt
)1−γ
= ((1− tw)wtLt − atLt)
γ (Yt − wtLt)
1−γ (1.13)
where γ denotes the bargaining power of the union. Solving the Nash-product reveals
that the net wage amounts to a fixed mark up over alternative income,
(1− tw)wt = µat = µ [φutbwt + (1− φut)(1− t
w)wt] (1.14)
with µ ≡ 1 + αγ
(1−α)
. Rearranging equation (1.14) shows that the bargaining process
directly determines the rate of unemployment7
ut =
(µ− 1)(1− tw)
µφ(1− tw − b)
. (1.15)
The unemployment rate resulting from the wage bargaining process depends on
the wage tax, while the wage tax arising from the governments budget restriction
depends on the rate of unemployment (equation (1.8)). In line with Bräuninger
(2005), solving the two equations verifies the existence of either two unemployment
7However, to obtain a positive and finite solution of the unemployment rate, mild parameter
restrictions on b have to imposed. More specifically, unemployment benefits need to be lower
than the net wage, i.e. b < 1 − tw. In a related paper, Bräuninger (2005) shows that there
exists a maximum for the level of the replacement rate and the pension ratio above which the
unemployment rate converges to 1 and the economy thus collapses. This, of course, also holds for
the present analysis.
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Figure 1.2: Unemployment equilibria and the role of capital income taxation
equilibria of which only one is stable, or no equilibrium at all.8
These unemployment equilibria are displayed in Figure 1.2 as intersections of the
unemployment rate due to wage bargaining, ut(t
w), and the wage tax derived using
the public budget constraint, tw(ut, t
r). One can immediately reveal that for a fixed
capital income tax tr0, the stable unemployment equilibrium can be found at the
wage tax tw1 . Yet, increasing the capital income tax rate shifts the t
w(ut, t
r) graph
upwards, implying that a new stable equilibrium realizes itself at a lower wage tax
and a lower level of unemployment. This gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 1.1. There exists an indirect, positive effect of the capital income tax
on unemployment: Increasing tr decreases tw and thereby reduces unemployment.
Proposition 1 indicates that raising the capital income tax is associated with a
lower wage tax and, thus, constitutes a potential policy option to increase the level
of employment. The intuition behind this result is the following: A lower wage tax
increases the individual’s net wage and thus the union’s utility. Consequently, the
union can mitigate its wage demands and still attain the same utility level as before
the tax reform. Lower wage demands then reduce the level of unemployment. Yet,
at the same time an increase in the taxation of capital income might reduce private
savings incentives and thereby deteriorate growth. To assess the overall effect of
such a policy, the following sections studies the effects of changes in the capital
income tax on the growth factor of the economy.
8To see this, insert equation (1.8) into (1.15) to derive a quadratic expression determining the
unemployment rate which can be solved for two unemployment equilibria.
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1.3 Growth Effects
To determine the growth factor of the domestic capital stock, one needs to derive
aggregate savings by summing up individual savings over all residentsNt. Recall that
at every moment in time a proportion (1−ut) of the population is employed earning
(1 − tw)wt, while a fraction ut remains unemployed and receives unemployment
benefits bwt. Thus, aggregate savings can be stated as
St = ϑ(Rt+1, σ)[(1− t
w)(1− ut) + but]wtNt − θ(Rt+1, σ)pwt+1Nt. (1.16)
In a closed economy setup, aggregate savings of the young are used to finance next
period’s capital stock Kt+1 = St. Therefore, aggregate savings can be used to
determine the growth factor of capital gt = Kt+1/Kt. Expressing the wage rate
by the marginal productivity of labour yields an implicit expression for the growth
factor of capital,
gt = ϑ(Rt+1, σ)
((1− tw)(1− ut) + but)(1− α)A
(1− ut)
− θ(Rt+1, σ)
p(1− α)Agt
(1− ut)(1 + n)
(1.17)
Rearranging to determine the growth factor explicitly yields
gt =
ϑ(Rt+1, σ) ((1− t
w)(1− ut) + but)[
(1−ut)
(1−α)A
+ θ (Rt+1, σ)
p
(1+n)
] (1.18)
Now consider the growth effect of increasing the capital income tax,
∂gt
∂tr
=
(1− tw)(1− ut) + but
χ
·
∂ϑ
∂tr
−
gtp
(1 + n)χ
·
∂θ
∂tr
−
ϑ(Rt+1, σ)(1− ut)
χ
·
∂tw
∂tr
+
ϑ(Rt+1, σ)[
b
(1−α)A
− θ(Rt+1, σ)
p
1+n
(1− tw − b)]
χ2
∂ut
∂tr
(1.19)
with χ = (1−ut)
(1−α)A
+ θ(Rt+1, σ)
p
(1+n)
> 0. An increase of the capital income tax influ-
ences aggregate savings through four channels: Firstly, increasing the capital income
tax evokes the opposing substitution and income effects. Therefore, the overall ef-
fect on savings and, hence, on growth is ambiguous, ∂ϑ
∂tr
R 0, and depends on the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Secondly, a higher capital tax increases the
present value of pensions ∂θ
∂tr
> 0. As a consequence, aggregate savings decline as the
individuals save less for retirement indicating that the pension effect is detrimental
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to growth. Thirdly, raising the capital tax allows for reduction of labour income
taxes
(
∂tw
∂tr
)
< 0. This increases the net wage of the employed part of the popula-
tion, thereby leading to more income out of which to save. Thus, this budget effect is
equivalent to a pure positive income effect and fosters the growth process. Finally, as
has been established in proposition 1.1, increasing the capital income tax exerts an
indirect negative effect on unemployment
(
∂ut
∂tr
)
< 0. Lower unemployment in turn
has an ambiguous effect on growth, stemming from two opposing forces: On the one
hand aggregate income and thus also savings increase as the share of wage earners in
the population increases which is good for growth. On the other hand higher levels
of employment decrease efficiency which is assumed to be proportional to capital
per employed worker. Consequently, current and future wages decrease, thereby
lowering aggregate savings and growth9. The net effect turns out to be positive if
unemployment benefits are not too generous, i.e. if b <
(
1 + 1+n(1−α)Ap
1
θ(Rt+1,σ)
)
−1
(1−tw).
Still, the overall effect of raising the capital income tax depends both on the magni-
tude of the various effects and on the direction of the savings effect. This gives rise
to the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2. Increasing the capital income tax while maintaining a balanced
budget may enhance the growth factor.
The analysis reveals that lowering unemployment by raising the capital income
tax rate might be a valuable policy option with the byproduct of potentially even
promoting growth. However, it remains to be shown how realistic it is that the policy
change actually increases growth. To this end, the model economy is calibrated to
fit the situation of the EU15 and to analyze the growth effects of increasing the
capital income tax rate in different scenarios.
Before computing the growth effects of an increase of the capital income tax,
the parameters of the model have to be fixed. Note that one period in the model
is assumed to last half a generation, i.e. 30 years. Population grows at the rate
n ≈ 0.16, corresponding to an annual average growth rate of roughly 0.5% over the
last 30 years in the EU1510. On the side of the households, the parameter δ is set
to δ = 1, implying that individuals do not discount future consumption. Yet, in
9This negative effect is a direct implication of the assumed externality in production, namely
that higher unemployment increases efficiency, and would not arise under the alternative assump-
tion in which efficiency is assumed to be proportional to the per capita capital stock, see Bräuninger
(2005).
10See OECD (2008).
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order to evaluate the effect of a change in the discount rate, the case of δ = 0.55
is additionally considered, thereby matching an annual discount rate of 2%. With
respect to the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
there exists no consensus in the econometric literature. Consequently, most studies
like Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) or Dalgaard and Jensen (2007) assume log-utilities,
i.e. σ = 1.11 Since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is
crucial in determining the reaction of individual savings, alternative scenarios with
σ = 5/6 and σ = 10/7 are also included in the analysis.12
To focus on the role of revenue-neutral changes of capital income taxation on
growth and in line with the formal model analysis, the wage tax is determined en-
dogenously to balance the budget. The exogenously given policy variables pension
level p and replacement rate b are set to p = 0.63 and b = 0.32. Both values corre-
spond to recent averages in the EU15 (OECD, 2007a,b). The production function is
calibrated following the standard literature (Layard et al., 1991), entailing that the
capital income share α is approximated by α = 0.3. In order to match the average
unemployment rate in the EU15 of 7.7% in 2006, the parameter φ is set to 2.25
and bargaining power of the union γ equals 0.175, resulting in a mark-up over the
alternative income of µ = 1.075.13 Following the literature and matching the data of
the EU15, the production efficiency index is set to A = 14.14 This generates annual
growth and after tax interest rates of 1.5% and 4.5% for a capital income tax rate
of 35%.15 The parameters of the model are summarized in table 1.1.
In a next step, the effects of an increase of the capital income tax on growth are
computed. Since there are no transitional dynamics, such a shock can completely be
described by the derivative of the growth factor with respect to the capital income
tax, ∂gt/∂t
r. Varying tr, σ and δ, the entries in table 1.2 depict the annualized
growth effects of a marginal increase in the capital tax rate, ∂gt/∂t
r. Since tw is
11Dalgaard and Jensen (2007) justify this observing that the empirical savings elasticity is more
or less constant. This implies that substitution and income effects offset each other, which will
only be the case if σ = 1.
12These choices correspond to the values used by Rivas (2003) who carries out a similar calibra-
tion exercise.
13Since estimates of µ lie in the range of [1.05, 1.15], the parameter choice is in line with the
empirical literature, see e.g. Layard et al. (1991).
14Note that a slightly higher value than the one used by Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) is chosen
here in order to generate more plausible values for the growth and interest rate.
15This choice is in line with Rivas (2003). Moreover, the value roughly matches the average
effective tax rate on capital income for the EU15 countries in the period of 1975-2000 (Carey and
Rabesona, 2002).
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Parameters
population growth rate n≈ 0.16
individual discount rate δ=1 [0.55]
elasticity of substitution σ=1 [0.83, 1.43]
pension level p=0.63
replacement rate b=0.32
capital income share α=0.3
capital income tax rate tr=0.35
index of labour market fluctuations φ=2.25
union bargaining power γ=0.175
production efficiency index A=14
Table 1.1: Fixed parameters
endogenously determined, each choice of the capital income tax tr implies a corre-
sponding wage tax rate, displayed in the second row. The range of capital income
tax rates is chosen to roughly match labour income tax rates in the EU15, ranging
from 23% to 56%.
The calibration exercise reveals that there are cases with plausible parameter
constellations where an increase in the capital income tax fosters growth, e.g. for
capital income tax rates between 0.25 and 0.5, growth rises if the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution does not exceed σ = 1. Clearly, in case of σ > 1, positive
growth effects are less probable as the substitution effect, that negatively affects
savings, becomes more and more pronounced. Moreover, as the capital income
tax increases, it is less likely that the proposed policy reform promotes growth.
Rather, the growth effect of marginally raising the capital tax is decreasing in tr.
Consequently, there seems to exist a growth-maximizing capital income tax rate
which, however, depends on the preferred parameter values. For σ = 1, for example,
this growth-maximizing capital income tax rate is well above 50%.
What are the policy conclusions to be drawn from this calibration exercise? Of
course, the model can not exactly mirror the situation in the EU15. Still it points to
an important insight that has so far been neglected in policy discussions: The effects
of raising the capital income tax rate are not as straightforward as often suggested.
Especially when allowing for social security systems and unemployment, additional
effects arise that might offset the (possibly negative) direct savings effects. As has
been shown, this might not only influence growth positively, but moreover raise the
level of employment if revenues are used to lower wage-related contribution rates.
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σ = 0.83 σ = 1 σ = 1.43
tr tw δ = 1 δ = 0.55 δ = 1 δ = 0.55 δ = 1 δ = 0.55
0.25 0.53 0.037 0.036 0.034 0.032 0.028 0.022
0.3 0.49 0.025 0.024 0.021 0.019 0.015 0.009
0.35 0.46 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.002
0.4 0.44 0.015 0.014 0.011 0.009 0.004 -0.004
0.45 0.41 0.012 0.010 0.007 0.005 -0.001 -0.009
0.5 0.39 0.009 0.007 0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.014
0.55 0.36 0.005 0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.011 -0.020
0.6 0.34 0.002 0.000 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 -0.025
Table 1.2: Growth effects of marginally raising the capital income tax
1.4 Welfare Effects
So far, the analysis has focused on the growth effects of increasing capital taxation.
However, it remains unclear in which way the reform affects the welfare of the
different generations and if potential losers can be compensated by the winners of the
tax change. Yet, this is of special importance in determining the political support
for such a reform. To address this issue, the following section sheds light on the
question whether a reform capable of generating positive growth effect additionally
leads to a net welfare gain for the economy. To this end, the welfare effects of a
tax reform today are firstly evaluated for the currently young and all successive
generations, given that growth is indeed positively affected. In a second step, the
welfare effects for the currently old population are derived and the potential for
compensation is determined in a calibration exercise.
Consider first the welfare effects of the currently young and all subsequent gen-
erations. As the tax change is assumed to be announced prior to private decision
making, these individuals can fully adjust to the new tax rates. To determine the
welfare effects of these adjustments, one needs to derive the individual’s indirect
utility function V (Rt+1, It, wt+1). Recall that income It refers to the net wage in
case of employment and to unemployment benefits in case of job loss. Noting that
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wages grow at the rate gt/(1 + n) simplifies the indirect utility function to
V (Rt+1, It, gt) =
[1 + δσRσ−1t+1 ]
1
σ
1− 1/σ
(
It +
pwtgt
(1 + n)Rt+1
)1− 1
σ
−
(1 + δ)
1− 1/σ
, (1.20)
which describes the individual’s maximum utility given the price for future con-
sumption Rt+1 and the present value of life-time income, It+
pwtgt
(1+n)Rt+1
. The welfare
effects for the young and all successive generation can now be derived as
∂V
∂tr
=χ˜
(
∂It
∂tw
∂tw
∂tr
+
pwt
(1 + n)Rt+1
∂gt
∂tr
+
(
∂It
∂wt
+
pgt
(1 + n)Rt+1
)
∂wt
∂ut
∂ut
∂tr
)
(1.21)
+χ˜

 δσRσt+1It − pwtgt(1+n)
R2t+1
(
1 + δσRσ−1t+1
)︸ ︷︷ ︸

 ∂Rt+1
∂tr
R 0
with χ˜ =
(
1+δσRσ−1t+1
It+
pwtgt
(1+n)Rt+1
) 1
σ
> 0. Clearly, changes in the capital income tax rate affect
welfare via four different channels. Firstly, increasing the capital income tax directly
reduces the private return to savings, ∂Rt+1
∂tr
< 0 and, thereby, affects the present
value of an individual’s life-time income in an ambiguous way: On the one hand, it
induces an income effect that decreases future consumption possibilities, but on the
other hand it increases the present value of future pensions. Secondly, raising the
capital tax allows for a reduction of the wage tax, ∂t
w
∂tr
< 0, which increases the net
income of employed individuals and, thus, their present and future consumption.
Consequently, the positive effects of the tax reform are higher for employed individ-
uals than they are for the unemployed and can at least partially offset the possibly
negative effects resulting from changes in the private return to savings. Thirdly, the
growth effects of the tax reform directly influence future wages and, therefore, the
pension income of individuals. As has been discussed before, these growth effects are
in general ambiguous, ∂gt
∂tr
R 0. Yet, if positive growth effects are present, these will
contribute to the welfare of the currently young and all successive generations and,
thereby, render a net welfare gain even more probable. Finally, from proposition 1.1
it is clear that an increase in the capital income tax reduces unemployment, ∂ut
∂tr
< 0,
which in turn negatively impacts on wages and social security benefits and thus the
income of the employed and unemployed individuals as labour efficiency declines.
Consequently, this channel unambiguously reduces consumption possibilities of the
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young individuals.16
The welfare effects for the currently old population are more clear-cut as these
individuals can no longer adjust to changes in tax rates. Rather, decisions on the
amount of savings of this generation, st−1, have been made prior to the tax reform
and, together with pension, determine their level of old-age consumption, dt =
Rtst−1 + pwt. While the level of pension in the period of reform remains unchanged,
an increased capital income tax, on the one hand, reduces the returns of these savings
and, on the other hand, the wage level which in turn reduces the absolute amount
of received pension benefits as unemployment declines. Consequently, individual
welfare will unambiguously be lower:
∂U(ct−1, dt)
∂Rt
∂Rt
∂tr
= δd
− 1
σ
t ·
(
st−1
∂Rt
∂tr
+ p
∂wt
∂tr
)
(1.22)
with ct−1 and dt denoting current and old-age consumption of the generation born
in period t− 1. As equation (1.22) reveals, the old generation experiences a welfare
loss. This gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3. Increasing the capital income tax while maintaining a balanced
budget may enhance individual welfare for the current and all subsequent generations,
while the presently old generation experiences a welfare loss.
As the welfare effects for the young generation are ambiguous while the old gen-
eration loses, it remains unclear whether the reform can generate a net welfare gain.
Thus, political support might be lacking even in case of positive growth effects.
To clarify whether this is indeed the case, the proceeding calibration computes the
marginal welfare effects of the tax reform, given that growth is positively effected,
∂gt/∂t
r > 0. More precisely, the calibration builds on the previous calibration ex-
ercise and determines the welfare effects for the range of capital income tax rates
for which a positive growth effect has been derived. For clarity of presentation, the
results displayed refer to the case σ = 1.17 The parameter choices as depicted in
16Without loss of generality, the infinite sum of all future generations is not taken explicitly
into account. This is due to the fact that if the reform is capable of generating a welfare gain
for the currently young individuals and a positive growth effect, utility levels of all subsequent
generations will in fact be higher. More specifically, a positive growth effect is a sufficient condition
to enhance utility for all subsequent generations provided that there is a gain for the currently
young. Furthermore, the latter aspect is, in practise, crucial for political support of such a reform.
17The findings are, however, equally well supported by the calibration results for σ = 5/6 and
σ = 10/7.
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young old net effect
tr tw δ = 1 δ = 0.55 δ = 1 δ = 0.55 δ = 1 δ = 0.55
0.25 0.51 1.42 1.33 -0.43 -0.24 1.21 1.31
0.3 0.49 1.07 1.02 -0.44 -0.25 0.80 0.94
0.35 0.46 0.89 0.87 -0.46 -0.25 0.57 0.75
0.4 0.44 0.74 0.75 -0.47 -0.26 0.39 0.61
0.45 0.42 0.61 0.65 -0.48 -0.27 0.22 0.49
0.5 0.40 0.48 0.56 -0.50 -0.27 0.06 0.38
Table 1.3: Welfare effects of marginally raising the capital income tax for currently
and formerly employed individuals (σ = 1 and ∂gt/∂t
r > 0)
table 1.1 remain unchanged. Moreover, the capital stock in the period of tax reform
has been normalized to one. The entries in tables 1.3 and 1.4 depict the welfare
effects of a marginal increase in the capital income tax rate for the young and old
generation respectively, distinguishing between individuals with and without an em-
ployment history. The net welfare effect is derived comparing the marginal welfare
effect of the currently young generation with the loss of the old generation, taking
into account that the population grows at rate n and unemployment declines as a
response to lower labour income taxation. This net effect determines the scope for
compensation between winners and losers in the period of reform. As the calibration
reveals, a positive overall net welfare effect may arise as long as capital income taxa-
tion promotes growth: Although the old generation and the unemployed individuals
experience a decline in consumption18, as can be inferred from table 1.4, the gains
for the young and employed are likely to be high enough to compensate them, e.g.
by means of an intergenerational transfer in the period of reform. This can be seen
18Note that due to the assumed externality in production, namely Et = Kt/Lt, consumption
levels of the young and unemployed individuals are not only reduced by a lower rate of return
to their savings but also because higher employment tends to exert a negative external effect by
limiting Kt/Lt and therefore non-rival knowledge which in turn leads to lower wages as efficiency
declines. This negative externality would, however, not be present for the alternative assumption,
namely that efficiency is proportional to capital per worker (Bräuninger, 2005). Thus, a positive
net welfare effect for the economy can be expected to become even more likely in this scenario. The
disadvantage of such modeling, however, would be the loss of analytical tractability with respect to
the derivation of the growth effects as, in this case, unemployment would negatively affect growth
and the interest rate.
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young old net effect
tr tw δ = 1 δ = 0.55 δ = 1 δ = 0.55 δ = 1 δ = 0.55
0.25 0.51 -0.66 -0.53 -0.26 -0.13 -1.02 -0.74
0.3 0.49 -0.33 -0.27 -0.23 -0.10 -0.60 -0.42
0.35 0.46 -0.22 -0.18 -0.19 -0.08 -0.45 -0.29
0.4 0.44 -0.18 -0.14 -0.16 -0.06 -0.37 -0.22
0.45 0.42 -0.17 -0.13 -0.12 -0.03 -0.32 -0.18
0.5 0.40 -0.18 -0.12 -0.08 -0.00 -0.29 -0.14
Table 1.4: Welfare effects of marginally raising the capital income tax for currently
and formerly unemployed individuals
by comparing the net welfare effects from the two tables and taking into account
the relative shares of employed and unemployed individuals in total population.
1.5 Conclusion
The present chapter analyzes the growth effects of a revenue neutral tax reform
that increases the tax rate on capital income to reduce wage-related social security
contributions. It is found that such a policy not only reduces unemployment but
can additionally promote economic growth. The overall effect on growth, however,
depends on different, partly opposing effects on capital accumulation. Firstly, the
lower wage tax directly raises the net income of households, thereby fostering sav-
ings and, consequently, growth. Secondly, the present value of pensions increases,
inducing a disincentive to accumulate capital and, thus, leading to lower growth.
Thirdly, there are the opposing income and substitution effects, having an ambigu-
ous impact on growth. Fourthly, increasing the capital income tax exerts an indirect
negative effect on unemployment which in turn has an ambiguous effect on growth.
Depending on the magnitude of the various effects, a policy reform that increases
the capital income tax in a revenue-neutral way has the scope to not only reduce
unemployment but moreover facilitate the growth process.
Calibrating the model to match data from the EU15 suggests that the aforemen-
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tioned tax reform can indeed be growth-enhancing if the initial capital income tax is
not too high. This is due to the fact that there seems to exist a growth-maximizing
level of the capital income tax below which any increase of the tax on capital in-
come contributes to the growth process. Moreover, it is shown that political support
for the aforementioned reform is probable as long as growth-promoting effects are
present: since the gains of the young and employed individuals outweigh the losses
for the old and unemployed, the reform generates a net welfare gain for the entire
population.
The present results are derived within the context of a model that is general
in some respects, but of course it depends on other, less general assumptions. For
example, the analysis assumes a closed economy. This naturally raises the question if
the present findings still hold in case the economy is opened to capital mobility since,
in fact, capital is internationally mobile. In this respect, it could easily be shown
that all the qualitative results are not affected by allowing for (imperfect) capital
mobility; only the magnitudes of the comparative statics are changed. Moreover,
for a detailed discussion of capital income taxation in open economies, see Palomba
(2008), who finds an ambiguous relation between capital income taxation and the
growth rate, similar to the present results. Consequently, the findings of this paper
are likely to hold if international capital mobility is allowed for.
The following chapter continues to study the growth effects of capital income tax-
ation in the presence of intergenerational transfers, but instead of relying on public
transfers in form of public pensions, the focus of the analysis is on private transfers
in form of bequests. Moreover, the issue of spending composition when governments
may decide on allocating a given tax revenue towards alternative spending categories
and its implications for the growth process will be discussed. While the present anal-
ysis reveals that an increase in the capital income tax rate in order to finance social
security benefits and to reduce the pressure on wage taxes may enhance growth, this
result does no longer hold in the presence of private transfers: As long as bequests
are positive, individuals encounter any public redistribution resulting from shifts in
the tax levels by adjusting their own savings and bequests which unambiguously
reduces growth. Under which circumstances, however, a positive growth effect due
to an increase in the capital income tax is still possible will be one of the issues
addressed in the proceeding chapter.
Chapter 2
Capital taxation, economic growth
and bequests
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
Over the last decades there has been a long-lasting debate in the empirical and the-
oretical economic literature on whether, and if so how, fiscal policy affects economic
growth. Numerous papers have analyzed the effects of taxation, transfers, spending,
and other actions related to fiscal policy on economic performance. There are at
least two things that can be concluded from these studies: First, fiscal policy does
affect economic growth. Second, the extent and the direction of the concrete policy
at hand generally depend on the specification of the model. Concerning taxation
of income, especially from capital, it is, however, commonly believed that there is
an adverse effect on growth. Models analyzing the equilibrium relationship between
capital income taxes and growth typically find that an increase of the capital income
tax reduces the return to private investment, which in turn implies a decrease of
capital accumulation and thus growth (Lucas, 1990; Rebelo, 1991). Besides these
positive studies, there also exists a huge body of literature dealing with normative
effects of capital income taxation, originally triggered by Judd (1985) and Chamley
(1986), who find that capital taxation decreases welfare and a zero capital tax is
thus efficient in the long-run steady state.
In some theoretical work, however, provocative evidence is put forward that cap-
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Figure 2.1: Personal Savings versus Capital Income Tax Rates in the US
Source: Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996), Figure 1.
ital income taxation may increase growth (Uhlig and Yanagawa, 1996; Rivas, 2003).
Time series of capital income tax rates and personal savings in the US, for instance,
seem to be positively correlated in the long run, suggesting that the conventional
wisdom of low capital taxes fostering growth is less clear cut than had been proposed
by most preceding theoretical studies. This point is visualized in Figure 2.1 which
shows a plot of the US personal savings rate versus the US capital income tax rate
over time.
Yet, an important deficiency of these studies is the absence of intergenerational
transfers in form of bequests. The importance of such transfers for capital accumula-
tion has been documented by several papers; see for instance Kotlikoff and Summers
(1981, 1986), who find that 45 % to 80 % of the capital stock held by households in
the United States are due to intergenerational transfers, and, more recently, DeLong
(2003, Fig. 2-1)who estimates the share of bequest in total wealth to be 43 %.
These studies confirm a significant influence of bequests on capital accumulation
and growth. What they cannot reveal, however, is the actual individual motive for
leaving bequests.1 Most of the existing literature models that motive by assuming
1For a comprehensive survey of different altruistic bequest motives see Michel et al. (2006).
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that individuals take into account the infinite stream of descendants’ utilities as in
Barro (1974). Within such a setting, various authors have shown that capital income
taxation typically translates into lower growth2. The main criticism of Barro’s ap-
proach is that a whole dynasty behaves as one decision unit having perfect foresight
about the indefinite future.
Alternatively, individuals may be assumed to have a joy-of-giving bequest motive
(Andreoni, 1989). In this case, the time horizon is finite, but the magnitude of
transfers is independent of the descendant’s well-being, and thus capital taxation
may have a positive effect on growth under similar conditions as in Uhlig and Yana-
gawa (1996). In the present work, however, the so called family altruism model is
adopted, which allows to work with a finite planning horizon and, at the same time,
leaves the bequest motive sensitive to the offspring’s economic situation (Lambrecht
et al., 2005, 2006; Bréchet and Lambrecht, 2009). Within such a setting, parents
are concerned about the disposable income of their immediate descendants and not
about the use of this income.3 Consequently, the disposable income of the children
(not their utility) becomes an argument of the individual’s utility function. Em-
pirical evidence for the family altruism model is provided by Laitner and Justner
(1996), who find that the amount of households’ bequests is largest for those with
the lowest assessment of children’s possible earnings.4 Altogether, such a specifica-
tion is clearly more general than the joy-of-giving approach and seems to be more
realistic than Barro’s model.
In the next section, the family altruism motive is incorporated into an endogenous
growth model in order to study two important fiscal policies. Firstly, the effect
of capital income taxation on long-run growth is reexamined if intergenerational
transfers within the family are operative. Secondly, the focus of the analysis is on
how the composition of government spending affects the growth rate. The model
2This kind of model is formally equivalent to one assuming a representative and infinite-lived
agent; see, again, Lucas (1990) and Rebelo (1991).
3This formulation originally goes back to Becker and Tomes (1979), who assume that parents
care about the quality or the economic success of their children as measured by the children’s
lifetime income. Such an approach has also been used in growth models with human capital; see,
e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), in which preferences depend on the quality of schools, which
in turn are directly related to the disposable income of the children. See also Grüner (1995).
4See also Mankiw (2000), who argues that neither the Barro model nor the pure life-cycle
model is suited to analyze fiscal policy. This is due to three important observations: First, in
reality consumption smoothing over time is not as perfect as both models predict. Second, there
are a lot of households near zero wealth for which saving is not a normal activity. Third, the
life-cycle model cannot account for the importance of bequests in capital accumulation.
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describes a unified framework comprising the results found by Uhlig and Yanagawa
(1996) and Rivas (2003) as special cases whenever intergenerational transfers are
inoperative and the government uses additional tax revenue from capital taxation
to either reduce the tax burden on labour income or enhance productive government
spending.
Endogenous growth in this model is generated by a positive externality of a frac-
tion of total government spending that affects private investment and bequest deci-
sions. This type of spending is referred to as public services (or productive spending,
as above) and captures expenditures on the stock of a country’s infrastructure, in-
cluding, e.g., highways, hospitals, and communication systems.5 The government
decides about the fraction of total outlays allocated to either productive spending or
usual government consumption that do not affect productivity. Furthermore, public
services are assumed to be provided without user fees, and, for reasons of simplicity,
the issue of congestion is ruled out.
It turns out that the results critically depend on how the government uses the
additional tax revenue resulting from an increase of the capital income tax. Growth
unambiguously declines in the presence of intergenerational transfers if expenditures
are fixed and revenue from capital income taxation is used to cut labour taxes, but
may increase if public services are enhanced instead. Finally, the impact of changing
the composition of total spending in favor of government consumption on growth is
clearly negative. These results are generally driven by three channels: First, they
depend on how savings react to changes in long-run interest rates. Second, they
depend on the mechanism of income redistribution, which is either a shift of the tax
burden across generations or a shift in factor productivity. Third, the possibility of
redistributing income within the family as a reaction to a change in the tax structure
matters. Numerical results reveal realistic parameter constellations in which growth
increases if income is redistributed through an increase in total factor productivity.
Though the qualitative results for each fiscal policy described above are consistent
with the findings of previous studies, see e.g., Barro (1990) and Caballé (1998), the
contribution of the present chapter is to stress the sensitivity of policy implications
to the presence of bequests within the family as compared to the dynastic altruism
assumed in Barro (1974). In the present model, the response of individuals’ bequest
5For a recent review of the role of public spending in endogenous growth theory see Minea
(2008).
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decisions to fiscal policy has a key role in determining the relationship between
capital income taxation and growth as will be further explained below.
The idea that public spending may have a positive effect on growth has received
much attention in both the empirical and the theoretical literature. Following the
pioneering work of Aschauer (1989), many empirical studies confirm the result that
public investment positively affects the return to private capital and thus private
investment (e.g., Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Gramlich 1994; Morrison and Schwartz
1996)6. On theoretical grounds, much of the literature follows the seminal work of
Barro (1990), who establishes productive government services to be one important
source of sustained endogenous growth. In these models, the relation of income
taxation and growth is usually nonlinear, depending on the initial level of taxation.
Yet, in those studies the analysis is conducted within a representative, infinite-lived
agent model and is thus not able to capture the impact of taxation on life-cycle
savings and intergenerational transfers within the family.
Finally, the present work also addresses the welfare implications of the model
which is of special importance in determining the political support for any of the
above mentioned policy reforms. By analyzing the welfare effects for the currently
young and old generation, it is found that when bequests are inoperative, positive
growth effects are accompanied by a welfare gain for the economy if the level of
capital income taxation is not too high. By contrast, in case of operative bequests,
the welfare effects are generally ambiguous depending on the relative strength of the
effects of fiscal policy on growth and interest rates. However, a shift of government
expenditures in favor of government consumption clearly reduces not only growth
but also welfare irrespectively of bequests being operative or not.
2.1.2 Related Literature
From a technical point of view, there are a lot of studies that examine the relation
of capital taxation and growth in the presence of bequests and then distinguish the
two cases of operative transfers and bequest constraints (see, e.g., Ihori 1997; Ca-
ballé 1998). In general, these studies find negative (or no) growth effect if bequests
are operative, depending on how the additional revenue from increased taxation is
6Note, however, that some studies either face difficulties in isolating a positive effect in cross
section data or even report a negative relation of government spending and growth in that high
spending may decrease income, e.g. Agell et al. (1997) and Evans and Karragas (1994).
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used. In a pioneering paper, Caballé (1998) shows that the presence of intergen-
erational transfers may reverse the relation between capital income taxation and
growth: If bequests are inoperative, an increase in the capital income tax may have
a growth-enhancing effect, provided that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is sufficiently low. Yet, in case of operative bequests, the economy behaves dynasti-
cally and a zero tax rate would be optimal from a growth- (and welfare-) maximizing
point of view. However, the modeling of the bequest motive in this chapter is in
contrast to most of this literature and it is a priori not clear if the results also hold
in the framework of the family altruism model.7 So far, there have only been a few
papers dealing with intergenerational transfers within the family: Lambrecht et al.
(2005) analyze the effect of public pensions on growth when altruistic parents can
affect their children’s income through investment in education and by leaving be-
quests. It turns out that an increase in the pension level is bad for growth, in that
it distorts the decision between bequest and education in the case of inoperative
bequests. Lambrecht et al. (2006) study different fiscal policies within a neoclas-
sical framework. They find that a pay-as-you-go pension scheme has no effect on
the intertemporal equilibrium, whereas public debt is not neutral, because private
intergenerational transfers cannot neutralize public intergenerational transfers in-
duced by public debt. Finally, Bréchet and Lambrecht (2009) examine the interplay
between population growth and the use of natural resources, which can either be
used in production or bequeathed to the children. They find that the strength of
the bequest motive is crucial in determining the role of resource preservation as a
reaction to demographic shocks.
The most closely related studies are Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) and Rivas (2003);
also, Aschauer (1989) and Morrison and Schwartz (1996) provide empirical evidence
for some of the results concerning the role of productive government spending. More-
over, the specification of the family altruism model can be justified by the empirical
findings of Laitner and Justner (1996) and Mankiw (2000).
Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) set up an overlapping-generations model in which en-
dogenous growth is generated by a positive externality—viz., technological spillovers
in production, across firms. Moreover, government expenditures are assumed to be
a fixed fraction of output, being financed by proportional taxes on wage and capital
7Note that when bequests are operative in this framework, the economy will not behave dynas-
tically as in the standard Barro model. Rather, each family forms a distinct decision unit, having
a finite time horizon (Lambrecht et al., 2006).
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income. As labour income accrues mostly to the young generation and capital in-
come to the old generation, a shift of the tax burden from wage to capital taxation
may then increase growth if the interest elasticity of savings is sufficiently small.8
Rivas (2003), by contrast, presents an overlapping-generations model in which
sustained growth is ensured by public investment in a country’s infrastructure, i.e.,
productive government spending. In fact, this is a different source of externality in
production that is capable of generating endogenous growth. This model explicitly
takes into account the composition of total government outlays: Tax revenue can
be allocated either to government consumption, to public services, or to transfers.9
Rivas shows that within such a setting increased capital taxation may enhance
growth if, again, the interest elasticity of savings fulfils some restrictions. Yet, the
result does not require a shift of the tax burden, but stems from the effect of taxation
on factor productivity, which constitutes an alternative channel for redistributing
income among generations.
Consequently, these studies indicate that the actual mechanism of direct or indi-
rect income redistribution across generations matters in determining the outcome of
capital taxation on growth. By allowing for intergenerational transfers within the
family, the present research adds an alternative private redistribution channel to the
analysis and then reexamines the effect of capital taxation on growth. Interestingly,
it turns out that the latter channel offsets the income redistribution induced by the
shift of the tax burden but cannot (totally) compensate intergenerational redistri-
bution induced by changes in total factor productivity. By contrast, in the latter
scenario, positive growth effects are obtained under weaker assumptions than in the
case when intergenerational transfers are absent.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
basic model. The intertemporal equilibrium for this economy is defined, and it is
shown that such an equilibrium is characterized either by operative or by inoperative
8In a recent contribution, however, Ho and Wang (2007) show that the relation between capital
income taxation and growth is non-monotonic if capital accumulation is subject to the adverse
selection problem in the credit market. More specifically, if risk types of borrowers are unknown
to lenders, capital taxation worsens the adverse selection problem, thereby inducing an additional
negative effect on growth that diminishes the positive effect stemming from a shift of the tax
burden across generations.
9Note, however, that if government expenditures are fixed, a shift of the tax burden from the
young to the old as in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) is then capable of generating their positive-
growth result. In this case the two models are formally equivalent and the only difference is the
source of sustained growth.
CHAPTER 2. CAPITAL TAXATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND BEQUESTS 36
bequests. For both cases the growth effects of capital taxation are determined in
Sections 2.3 and 2.4. Further, in Section 2.5, the impact of an increase in government
consumption on growth is analyzed, the model is calibrated using US data, and the
numerical results are presented in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 analyzes how the different
policy reforms affect the welfare of the living generations, the currently young and
the presently old. Finally, Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 The model
The basic framework is an overlapping-generation model in the tradition of Diamond
(1965), in which parents have an altruistic concern for their children. In contrast to
most of the existing literature, this concern is modeled by providing children with
a disposable income later on in life, i.e., the disposable income of the child becomes
an argument of the individual utility function (Lambrecht et al., 2006). Moreover,
markets are competitive, and the size of population is assumed to be constant. The
government collects taxes and allocates the revenue to either productive govern-
ment spending or nonproductive government consumption. This setup is capable of
generating an endogenous growth process in line with Barro (1990).
2.2.1 Firms
On the production side of the model, perfect competition between a large number of
identical firms is assumed. A representative firm in period t produces a homogenous
output good according to a Cobb–Douglas production function with capital Kt and
homogeneous labour Lt as inputs:
Yt = AK
α
t (G
s
tLt)
1−α, (2.1)
where 1 > α > 0 is the share parameter of capital, A > 0 is a general index of
efficiency, and Gst denotes the flow of aggregate government services.
Each firm maximizes profits under perfect competition, implying that, in equi-
librium, production factors are paid their marginal products:
wt = (1− α)AK
α
t L
−α
t (G
s
t)
1−α (2.2)
CHAPTER 2. CAPITAL TAXATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND BEQUESTS 37
and
rt = αAK
α−1
t (G
s
tLt)
1−α. (2.3)
Clearly, an increase of the amount of government services Gst exerts a positive ex-
ternality on each firm’s output, since producers take Gst as given when maximizing
profits. This in turn enhances the productivity of labour and capital. The specific
form of the technology exhibits increasing returns to scale in labour, capital, and
government expenditures taken together. However, as will be shown below, there are
constant returns at the aggregate level, which enables one to analyze the long-run
growth effects of policy changes without transitional dynamics.
Due to the specification of the production technology, the model features scale
effects. Yet, as population size is assumed to be constant, these effects, and also
those of congestion (see, e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Glomm and Ravikumar
1998), are excluded from the analysis. More specifically, the assumption that the
aggregate flow of government services (instead of the per capita flow) enters the
production technology implies that public services are nonrival and nonexcludable.
2.2.2 Government
The government balances its budget in each period t. Revenue is generated by
proportional taxes on wage income, 0 ≤ tw ≤ 1, and interest income, 0 ≤ tr < 1,10
in order to finance the amount of total government spending Gt in period t. Total
spending can be decomposed into a fraction 0 ≤ φ < 1 of government consumption,
denoted Gct , and a fraction 1− φ of productive government services, denoted G
s
t :
Gt = G
c
t +G
s
t . (2.4)
Such a specification allows one to study the effect of a change in the composition
of total government expenditures on long-run growth. It is further assumed that
total expenditures are a fixed share of national output, i.e., Gt = κYt, where κ is
the government-spending–output ratio. A balanced budget, thus, requires
twwtLt + t
rrtKt = κYt. (2.5)
10In order to generate sustained long-run growth, the interest rate must be positive. This restricts
the capital income tax rate to be smaller than one.
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2.2.3 Consumers
At each period in time, there exist a number of young (Nt) and a number of old
individuals (Nt−1). The population is assumed to be stationary. When young, each
individual inelastically supplies one unit of labour and receives the net wage (1 −
tw)wt. She also receives a nonnegative bequest, bt. Income is spent on consumption
ct and savings st:
It ≡ (1− t
w)wt + bt = ct + st. (2.6)
When old, each individual allocates the return to savings (Rt+1st) to second-period
consumption (dt+1) and to a nonnegative bequest to the offspring (bt+1). The second
period’s budget constraint is thus
dt+1 = Rt+1st − bt+1, (2.7)
where Rt+1 = (1− t
r)rt+1 is the total private return to savings or the gross interest
factor after capital tax between dates t and t+ 1.11 The economy is called bequest-
constrained if bt+1 = 0, and bequests are operative if bt+1 > 0.
Individual preferences are of the CES type and depend on first- and second-period
consumption and on the disposable income of the children:
It+1 = (1− t
w)wt+1 + bt+1. (2.8)
Consequently, the life-cycle utility function of an individual born in t is
U(ct, dt+1, It+1) =
c
1−1/σ
t − 1
1− 1/σ
+ δ
[
d
1−1/σ
t+1 − 1
1− 1/σ
+ λ
(It+1)
1−1/σ − 1
1− 1/σ
]
. (2.9)
This specification allows one to explicitly study the effects of a varying degree of
altruism captured by the parameter λ ≥ 0. Here δ > 0 is a discount factor, and
σ > 0 the intertemporal substitution elasticity.
Each individual maximizes the utility (2.9), subject to the constraints (2.6), (2.7),
(2.8) and to the nonnegativity of bequests (bt+1 ≥ 0), by choosing ct, st, dt+1, and
bt+1. The first-order conditions of this maximization problem are
dt+1 = (Rt+1δ)
σct (2.10)
11For reasons of simplicity, it is assumed that capital depreciates completely.
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and
dt+1 ≤
(
1
λ
)σ
It+1 (= if bt+1 > 0). (2.11)
The first equation is the standard condition over the life cycle, determining optimal
savings. The second one gives the optimal amount of bequests. Bequests are positive
if the marginal utility from old-age consumption equals the marginal utility from
leaving the bequest.
Solving equation (2.10) subject to the budget constraints (2.6) and (2.7), the
optimal savings function is found:
st = ψ(Rt+1)It + (1− ψ(Rt+1))
bt+1
Rt+1
, (2.12)
where ψ(Rt+1) = (Rt+1δ)
σ/[Rt+1 + (Rt+1δ)
σ] is the saving rule. From equations
(2.11), (2.8), and (2.7) one obtains the optimal amount of bequest:
bt+1 =
λσ
1 + λσ
Rt+1st −
1
1 + λσ
(1− tw)wt+1. (2.13)
Individual savings depend positively on the disposable income and the amount of
bequest transferred to the descendant. In turn, optimal bequests are positively
related to individual savings, but decrease with increase of next period’s net wage.12
2.2.4 Intertemporal Equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, firms’ profits will be zero, and profit maximization im-
plies that each firm equates, for a given amount of productive government spending
Gst , the rental and the wage rate to the marginal products of capital and labour,
respectively (equations (2.3) and (2.2)). Consequently, each firm chooses the same
capital–labour ratio. With these facts, it is easy to obtain the share of national
output spent by the government, i.e., κ, as a weighted average of the tax rates: In-
sert the equilibrium factor prices into the government’s budget constraint, equation
12Note that equations (2.12) and (2.13) can easily be solved explicitly for st and bt+1, which are
then functions of individual income It, the interest factor Rt+1, and next period’s net wage (1 −
tw)wt+1. Yet, for reasons of convenience and in order to clarify the effect of private intergenerational
transfers on savings and growth, the following analysis rests on the equations mentioned above.
This, of course, does not affect any of the results.
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(2.5), and rearrange terms to reach
κ = (1− α)tw + αtr. (2.14)
The aggregate production technology is then given by the standard AK type with
constant returns to capital:
Yt = A˜Kt, (2.15)
where A˜ = [A((1− φ)κLt)
1−α]1/α. Aggregate input prices can thus be rewritten as
wt = (1− α)A˜KtL
−1
t (2.16)
and
rt = αA˜. (2.17)
Output and wage rate are proportional to capital and will grow at the same rate
as aggregate capital on a balanced growth path. The interest rate and thus also
the interest factor Rt+1 are constant and time-invariant
13. For a given composi-
tion of government expenditures, both marginal productivities increase with the
government-spending–output ratio κ, which in turn depends positively on both tax
rates. For fixed tax rates instead, input prices also increase if the government changes
the composition of expenditures in favour of productive spending (a decrease in the
parameter φ).
Given these facts, an intertemporal equilibrium of the economy can now be de-
fined as follows. Given a fiscal policy (parameters tw, tr, and φ) and an initial
value of the capital stock k0 = K0/N−1 = s−1, a perfect-foresight intertemporal
equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of quantities and prices:
{ct, dt, kt, st, bt; wt, rt}t≥0.
Individuals maximize utility, factor markets are competitive, and all markets clear.
13The time index will therefore be omitted in the following; it is R = Rt+1 for all t.
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The market-clearing conditions for the labour, capital and good markets are
Lt = Nt, (2.18)
Kt = Nt−1st−1, (2.19)
Yt = Nt(ct + st) +Nt−1dt +Gt. (2.20)
For all t, the values of Gst and G
c
t are determined by equations (2.4) and (2.5). The
condition (2.18) states that the labour market is characterized by full employment;
the demand for labour determines the market-clearing wage rate. The condition
(2.19) states that in each period, the stock of capital results from individuals’ savings
in the preceding period. The demand for capital determines the market-clearing
rental rate. According to Walras’ law in period t, the equilibria in the labour and
capital market imply that of the good market. Furthermore, by substituting the
young’s budget constraint, equation (2.6), into (2.20) and making use of (2.15) and
the relation Gt = κYt one obtains:
(1− κ)A˜Kt = NtIt +Nt−1dt (2.21)
In a next step, it is shown that the intertemporal equilibrium is characterized
by either operative or inoperative bequests, depending on the parents’ degree of
altruism towards their child. Moreover, the growth rates of the economy in both
cases are determined, and the conditions for a balanced growth path are specified.
The analysis reveals that there exists an explicit threshold for the altruism parameter
λ that indicates which of the two regimes, operative or inoperative bequests, is at
work.
The first step is to determine aggregate savings: Summing individual savings,
equation (2.12), over allNt young individuals and taking the definition of It, equation
(2.6), into account gives
St = ψ(R)[(1− t
w)wtNt + btNt] + (1− ψ(R))
bt+1Nt
R
. (2.22)
Aggregate savings are positively related to aggregate income (the sum of wage in-
come and the amount of bequest received from parents) and to aggregate bequests
devoted to children. The impact of an increase in the interest factor is ambiguous,
depending on the parameters of the model. In a closed economy, aggregate savings
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of the young are used to finance next period’s capital stock Kt+1 = St (the capital
market clearing condition). Therefore, the expression (2.22) can be used to deter-
mine the growth factor of capital, gt = Kt+1/Kt. Moreover, by the definition of a
balanced growth path, bequests grow at the same rate as capital, i.e., gt = bt+1/bt.
Finally, expressing the wage rate by the marginal productivity of labour, equation
(2.16), yields an implicit expression for the growth factor of capital,
gt = ψ(R)[(1− t
w)(1− α)A˜+ xt] + (1− ψ(R))
xtgt
R
, (2.23)
where xt = btNt/Kt defines the bequest–capital ratio in period t. This ratio equals
zero if and only if the economy is bequest-constrained, i.e., bt = 0. Solve (2.23) for
gt to get an explicit expression for the growth factor:
gt = ψ˜(R, xt)[(1− t
w)(1− α)A˜+ xt]. (2.24)
with ψ˜(R, xt) = (Rδ)
σ/[R + (Rδ)σ − xt]. In the case of inoperative bequests, it is
xt = 0. The growth factor is then constant over time, and ψ˜(R, 0) = ψ(R). In case of
operative bequests, however, growth is additionally affected by the bequest–capital
ratio xt. The analysis proceeds by showing that this ratio is constant on a balanced
growth path, implying that gt (in the case of operative bequests) in equation (2.24)
is also constant over time and there are no transitional dynamics.
From the definition of xt, it follows that bt = xtKt/Nt. Dividing equation (2.13),
the optimal amount of bequests devoted by parents to their child, by bt and recalling
that the wage rate grows at the same rate as aggregate capital, i.e., wt+1 = gt · wt,
yields
bt+1
bt
=
λσ
1 + λσ
R
stNt
btNt
−
1
1 + λσ
(1− tw)wt
gt
btNt
.
Now, expressing the wage rate in terms of the marginal productivity of labour,
equation (2.16), one gets
bt+1
bt
=
λσ
1 + λσ
R
1
xt
gt −
1
1 + λσ
(1− tw)(1− α)A˜
1
xt
gt. (2.25)
Further analysis of equation (2.25) gives rise to the following proposition:
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Proposition 2.1. On a balanced growth path, the bequest–capital ratio is constant
and satisfies
x ≡ xt =
1
1 + λσ
[
λσR− (1− tw)(1− α)A˜
]
. (2.26)
Bequests are operative, i.e., x > 0, as long as
λ > λˆ =
(
(1− tw)(1− α)A˜
R
)1/σ
. (2.27)
Proof: Setting bt+1/bt = gt in (2.25) and solving for xt gives (2.26). In turn,
solving (2.26) for λ gives the critical value in equation (2.27).
The threshold level λˆ is related negatively to the wage tax and positively to the
capital income tax. Bequests are thus more likely when wage taxes are high, since
individuals then foresee that the descendant’s economic situation will worsen as net
wages will be lower. The inverse relation applies to the capital income tax, because
a higher tax rate reduces the old’s return to their savings and consequently also
the amount of bequest that parents devote to their child. Consequently, excessive
capital income taxation may crowd out private intergenerational transfers.
On the basis of these findings, the following sections will reexamine the effect of
capital income taxation with (in)operative bequests on growth for two specific fiscal
policies: Firstly, a situation in which the additional revenue from an increase of the
capital income tax is used to cut the wage tax and government spending is fixed will
be considered. This is exactly the fiscal policy examined by Uhlig and Yanagawa
(1996), in which the shift of the tax burden generates a pure positive income effect
and thus possible positive growth effects due to increased savings. Secondly, an
increase of the capital income tax is used to enhance the government-spending–
output ratio, thereby boosting output and the marginal productivity of labour as
well as capital. Rivas (2003) shows that such a setting constitutes a different source
of positive growth effects.
In the following, without loss of generality, population size and thus also labour
supply will be normalized to one for reasons of simplicity, i.e. Nt = Lt = 1.
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2.3 Growth Effects
2.3.1 Revenue-neutral tax reform
Throughout this section it is assumed that the composition and the level of govern-
ment expenditures, i.e., the parameters φ and κ, are fixed. An increase of the capital
income tax rate tr is used to reduce the wage tax tw, implying that the wage tax is
now endogenously determined. Recall the expression for the government-spending–
output ratio, equation (2.14), and solve for tw to obtain
tw =
κ
1− α
−
α
1− α
tr. (2.28)
Under these assumptions, the model is very similar to the one in Uhlig and
Yanagawa (1996) if bequests are inoperative. Yet, the engines of growth are different
in the two models: In Uhlig and Yanagawa sustained growth results from a positive
technological spillover, whereas in this model public services ensure the existence
of a balanced growth path. Moreover, the presence of intergenerational transfers in
the form of bequests within the family adds additional effects to the growth process.
The formal analysis proceeds as follows:
The growth factor in the case of operative bequests, equation (2.24), depends
on the wage tax tw and the bequest–capital ratio x, where x in turn depends on
tw, equation (2.26). Plugging equation (2.28) into both expressions and rearranging
terms yields
x = R−
θ
1 + λσ
(2.29)
and
g = ψ˜(R, x)[θ −R + x] (2.30)
with θ = (1 − κ)A˜. Now, first look at the case when intergenerational transfers
are absent, i.e., x = 0. The growth factor is then influenced through two channels
that are captured by the two multiplicative factors determining the growth factor
in equation (2.30): Firstly, increasing the capital income tax evokes the well-known
opposing substitution and income effects. Therefore, the overall effect on savings
and hence on growth is ambiguous and depends on the interest elasticity of savings,
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which in turn depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution14. Secondly,
raising the capital tax allows for reduction of labour income taxes. This increases
the net wage of the working part of the population, thereby leading to more income
out of which to save. Thus, the second effect is equivalent to a pure positive income
effect and fosters the growth process. The overall effect turns out to be positive if the
interest elasticity of savings, denoted ǫ(R), is sufficiently small—more specifically, if
ǫ(R) <
IK
IL
, (2.31)
where IK/IL is the ratio of after-tax capital income to after-tax labour income.
This condition is exactly the same as stated by Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) in their
second proposition. The pure positive income effect then outweighs possible negative
substitution effects (occurring in the case of σ > 1).
However, if intergenerational transfers are operative, i.e., x > 0, the bequest–
capital ratio additionally influences growth via two channels: On the one hand, the
presence of intergenerational transfers affects the saving rule.15 In contrast to the
case of x = 0, savings are higher, since young individuals not only save for future
consumption but also to leave a positive amount of bequest. Yet, an increase of the
capital income tax enhances the disposable income of the immediate descendant, as
future net wages will increase. Anticipating this positive future income effect, the
current young generation reduces its savings in order to transfer a smaller amount
of bequest to its children in period t+ 1.
On the other hand, family members respond to the public income redistribution
due to the change in the tax structure by redistributing the total family income
(in period t).16 More specifically, currently old individuals reduce their amount of
14The interest factor elasticity of savings is defined as
ǫ(R) =
∂ψ(R)
∂R
R
ψ(R)
=
σ − 1
1 + δσRσ−1
.
15Recall that, in contrast to the case of inoperative bequests, this rule is now given by
ψ˜(R, x) =
(Rδ)σ
R+ (Rδ)σ − x
.
16Note that the tax reform under consideration does not affect total family income in period
t, which is the sum of returns to savings from the old plus the net wage of the young, i.e., Ωt =
(1− tw)wt +Rst−1. It is straightforward to show that ∂Ωt/∂t
r = 0.
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bequest by exactly the amount that barely offsets the negative income effect due to
a declining return to savings and the positive income effect of the young individuals
resulting from an increasing net wage.
Analytically, this can be shown by inserting equation (2.29) into (2.30). One then
obtains a simple expression for the growth factor with operative bequests that solely
depends on the interest factor R:
g =
(Rδ)σ
(Rδ)σ + θ
1+λσ
[
λσ
1 + λσ
θ
]
. (2.32)
From this equation, it is easy to see that the positive income effect is exactly canceled
out by an appropriate decrease of the bequest–capital ratio, since θ is independent
of the capital income tax rate. Moreover, optimal individual savings always decline
due to an increase of the capital income tax, as argued above.
The following proposition summarizes the above findings:
Proposition 2.2. A revenue-neutral increase of the capital income tax that de-
creases the wage tax
1. may increase growth in the case of inoperative bequests if the interest elasticity
of savings is sufficiently small, i.e.,
ǫ(R) <
IK
IL
;
2. unambiguously decreases growth if bequests are operative.
Proof: In the case of inoperative bequests, it is x = 0. Taking the derivative of
equation (2.30) with respect to tr gives
∂ψ(R)
∂R
(θ −R)− ψ(R) < 0.
Rewriting this inequality yields the result.
The saving rule in the case of operative bequests is
ψ˜(R, x) =
(Rδ)σ
R + (Rδ)σ − x
.
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Insert the bequest–capital ratio x, equation (2.29), to reach
ψ˜(R) =
(Rδ)σ
(Rδ)σ + θ
1+λσ
> 0.
Taking the derivative with respect to the capital income tax rate tr gives
dψ˜(R)
dtr
= −
θ
1 + λσ
ψ˜(R) < 0.
It follows that an increase of tr always reduces growth.
The analysis reveals that the overall effect is always negative when bequests are
operative. Consequently, the introduction of intergenerational transfers within the
family constitutes an additional objection to the results found by Uhlig and Yana-
gawa (1996). In their study, they already admit that there are no positive growth
effects if the overlapping-generations structure is extended to multiple periods of life.
The same holds if parents are concerned about the disposable income of their child.
Furthermore, Caballé (1998) derives a result that comes close to Proposition 2.2.
but that assumes altruistic preferences as in Barro (1974). The comparison allows
one to stress the critical relevance of intergenerational transfers for determining the
effect that capital income taxation has on growth. The time horizon of individual
decision making is not so relevant.
2.3.2 Increasing public services
Now, consider a situation in which the composition of government expenditures, φ,
and the labour tax rate, tw, are fixed. An increase of the capital income tax rate
is used to enhance productive government spending, implying that the government-
spending–output ratio κ is now endogenous and equation (2.14) holds.
Under these assumptions the model is very similar to the one in Rivas (2003)
in the case of inoperative bequests. However, if bequests are operative, there is an
additional channel that influences growth as in the preceding section. In contrast
to the model in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996), where the government finances a fixed
level of government consumption, the government is now provided with an active
role in the economy by allocating tax revenues to different categories of spending.
Moreover, growth is now primarily driven by changes in productivity rather than by
shifts of the tax burden.
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In order to assess the effect of capital income taxation on long-run growth, it turns
out to be important to determine the effect on the long-run interest rate. Following
Rivas (2003), the impact of an increase in the capital income tax on the interest
factor R is analyzed in a first step, and afterwards the growth effect is determined.
Taking the definition of the productivity index A˜ into account, the interest factor
becomes
R = (1− tr)αA1/α[(1− φ)κ](1−α)/α. (2.33)
It is easy to see that R is decreasing in φ and increasing in tw. However, there
exists a nonlinearity with respect to tr, since an increase of the capital income tax
decreases the capital tax factor on the one hand but enhances the government-
spending–output ratio κ (i.e., ∂κ/∂tr = α > 0) on the other hand. The overall
effect can be written as
∂R
∂tr
= R(ϑ(tr)− ϕ(tr)) (2.34)
with
ϑ =
∂A˜/∂tr
A˜
=
(
tw +
α
1− α
tr
)−1
and
ϕ = (1− tr)−1.
Here ϑ is the rate of change in total factor productivity due to changes in capital
taxation, and ϕ the rate of change in the capital tax factor, which can be interpreted
as the degree of distortion due to capital income taxation. Depending on the relative
strength of the two effects, an increase of the capital income tax may either increase
or decrease the net-of-tax interest factor, which in turn depends on the existing level
of taxation. These results are summarized in the next proposition:
Proposition 2.3. The interest factor R is a concave function of the capital income
tax tr, reaching a maximum at t¯r = (1−α)(1−tw). The direction of the change in the
total private return to savings (for given labour tax and expenditure composition) due
to an increase of the capital income tax depends on the ratio of government revenue
from capital taxation to the net-of-tax capital income of the private sector (equal to
R) for a given tax rate. It is given by
∂R
∂tr
≷ 0 ⇔ Aˆtr ≷
MK
R
,
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where
Aˆtr = ϑt
r =
∂A˜
∂tr
tr
A˜
=
(
tw
tr
+
α
1− α
)−1
is the elasticity of productivity with respect to the capital tax rate, and MK = t
rαA˜
is the government’s per unit of capital revenue from capital income taxation.
Proof: Consider the function
B(tr) = ϑ(tr)− ϕ(tr).
It is then straightforward to check that B(t¯r) = 0, where 0 < t¯r = (1−α)(1−tw) < 1.
Moreover, rewriting the inequality trB(tr) ≷ 0 yields the equivalence stated above.
In order to establish concavity, note that ϕ(0) = 1 < 1/tw = ϑ(0) with ϕ′(tr) > 0
and ϑ′(tr) < 0 for tr ∈ [0, 1). Consequently, ϑ and ϕ intersect only once in the
relevant range, namely at t¯r.
Note that these results are essentially the same as in Rivas (2003). What differs,
however, is the restrictions imposed on the tax rate parameters. In this model
the only restriction is tr < 1 in order to have a positive net-of-tax interest factor.
Rivas, by contrast, imposes an upper (lower) bound on the capital (labour) income
tax rate to ensure sustained growth. Those differences result from the simplifying
assumption of complete capital depreciation on the one hand and the fact that
lifetime income may be positive even if labour income is completely taxed away due
to intergenerational transfers on the other hand.
Given these prerequisites, one can now analyze the overall effect of an increase in
the capital income tax rate on growth in the case of (in)operative bequests. Recall
therefore equation (2.24), the growth factor. Similarly to the preceding section,
growth is affected through three channels with respect to capital income taxation:
Firstly, an increase in the capital income tax enhances productivity and thus wages
and income. Secondly, changes in capital taxation affect the real rate of return, which
in turn affects growth. The direction of this latter effect depends on the interest
elasticity of savings. Finally, the presence of intergenerational transfers distorts
the individual saving rule on the one hand and induces an adjustment of private
intergenerational transfers on the other hand. In order to simplify the theoretical
analysis, insert the bequest–capital ratio x, equation (2.26), into the growth factor,
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equation (2.24), and collect terms to reach
g =
(Rδ)σ
(Rδ)σ + 1
λσ
I(R, A˜)
· I(R, A˜) (2.35)
with
I(R, A˜) =
λσ
1 + λσ
[R + t¯rA˜].
Depending on the existing level of capital taxation, the model features positive
growth effects even if bequests are operative:
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that the the rate of capital income taxation is sufficiently
low, i.e., tr < t¯r, and that the composition of government spending is fixed. Increas-
ing the capital income tax then enhances growth even if bequests are operative.
Proof: In the following, the elasticity of a variable k with respect to the argument
j will be denoted kˆj.
The elasticity of the growth factor with respect to tr is then
gˆtr = gˆR
(
ˆ˜Atr −
MK
R
)
g + gˆI Iˆtr .
Calculating and inserting the respective elasticities, this equation can be rewritten as
gˆtr = g
[
σ
λσ(Rδ)σ
(
ˆ˜Atr −
MK
R
)
+
(1− α− κ)trA˜
1+λσ
λσ
κI
]
. (2.36)
Taking the definition of κ into account, it is straightforward to show that the second
term in the brackets is positive if and only if the initial capital income tax rate is
not too high, i.e., if tr < t¯r/α. In this case, the positive income effect of higher
net wages always offsets the (possibly) negative effect on individual income due to a
reduced amount of bequest. Consequently, for tr < t¯r one has ˆ˜Atr > MK/R, and the
above expression is clearly positive.
Three remarks are in order. First, note that the inequality stated in the above
proposition is a sufficient condition but not necessary. From equation (2.36) it is easy
to see that positive growth results are still possible even if the existing capital income
tax level exceeds the threshold value t¯r. In fact, there exists a growth-maximizing
level of the tax rate as long as t¯r < tr < t¯r/α. Second, if intergenerational transfers
are absent, i.e., x = 0, the model is equivalent to the one in Rivas (2003). The
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growth factor, equation (2.24), can then be written as
g = ψ˜(R, 0) ·
1 + λσ
λσ
I(0, A˜) =
(Rδ)σ
(Rδ)σ +R
t¯rA˜, (2.37)
implying that
gˆtr = ǫ(R)
(
ˆ˜Atr −
MK
R
)
+ ˆ˜Atr . (2.38)
A positive growth effect in this case requires not only a sufficiently small prevalent
capital income tax rate as above, i.e., tr < t¯r, but also an interest elasticity of savings,
ǫ(R), that exceeds zero. More specifically, the substitution effect must dominate the
income effect, which is fulfilled if σ ≥ 1. Consequently, a positive growth result
can be obtained under weaker assumptions when individuals have the possibility to
redistribute income within the family. Third, the above results can be interpreted as
confirming Barro (1990) who finds a humped-shaped relationship between taxation
and growth. In fact, it is easy to show that in case of a uniform income tax with
tr = tw, the above threshold level equals t¯r = 1 − α, restating Barro’s optimal tax
rule. The merit of the present analysis, however, is to highlight the significant role
of intergenerational transfers in determining the effect that capital income taxation
has on growth.
So what is the intuition behind these results? An increase of the capital income
tax increases the flow of public services if the composition of spending is unaltered.
This in turn enhances total factor productivity, thereby increasing the real wages
and thus the individual income of the young. Consequently, individuals are left
with more income out of which to save. This is the direct effect of capital taxation,
which increases aggregate savings and growth. Furthermore, income is affected by
the amount of bequest that individuals receive from their parents. This amount
may either increase or decrease, depending on the relative strength of the effects
from increased capital taxation on the wage and on the interest rate: If the positive
income effect of the young offsets the (ambiguous) effect stemming from changes in
the rate of return to the old’s savings, the amount of bequest declines as parents
deal with the negative effect of public income redistribution on their own income by
adjusting private intergenerational transfers.17
17Analytically, it is straightforward to show that a sufficient condition for bequests to decline,
i.e., ∂(1− tw)wt/∂t
r > ∂Rst−1/∂t
r, is α ≥ 0.5. In this case, the effect of capital taxation on
individual income is ambiguous, depending on the trade-off between higher net wages and reduced
bequests.
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There are two more indirect effects at work: On the one hand, movements of the
capital tax rate affect the after-tax rate of return to savings and thus the intertem-
poral price of consumption. The direction of this effect depends on the direction of
change in the interest rate and on how individuals adapt their consumption–saving
decision to this change. On the other hand, the presence of intergenerational trans-
fers affects the individual saving decision even further, since individuals adapt the
amount of bequest devoted to their child, and thus their savings, to changes in the
capital income tax rate. If future net wages increase, the current young individuals
save less to give a smaller amount of bequest to their descendants. Yet, the effect of
increased capital taxation on the individual saving decision is clear: savings decline
if and only if future income increases and the interest rate decreases.
To sum up, the overall effect on growth is generally ambiguous. However, the
analysis does not exclude positive growth effects even if bequests are operative.
So far, the analysis has shed light on the question how capital income taxation
affects growth under two specific fiscal policies when intergenerational transfers are
operative. The following section, by contrast, examines the impact of the outlay of
government expenditures on growth.
2.3.3 Changing the expenditure composition
In this section it is assumed that the tax rates, tw and tr, and thus also the total share
of government expenditures, κ, are fixed. The focus is now on changes in the pa-
rameter φ—more specifically, a situation in which the government decides to reduce
the amount of spending on public services in favour of an increase in government
consumption, i.e., an increase in φ. In the related model where intergenerational
transfers are absent, Rivas (2003) shows that such a policy unambiguously decreases
growth if the interest elasticity of savings exceeds zero. The intuition behind this
result is that a decline in government services reduces productivity and consequently
the return on savings and real wages. If the interest elasticity is sufficiently large,
both channels will reduce savings and thus growth. However, the situation is not
that clear if intergenerational transfers are operative. The overall effect on growth
then additionally depends on how private income redistribution within the family
reacts to such a policy reform.
In analogy to the preceding section, the amount of bequest that parents devote to
their child decreases if the negative income effect on the young caused by declining
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real wages is larger than the negative income effect on the old that stems from a de-
creased rate of return to savings.18 Consequently, bequests and thus also individual
and aggregate income may well increase through this channel. The overall effect on
income is then characterized by a trade-off between lower real wages and a larger
amount of bequests. Yet, analytical results indicate that the negative effect always
offsets the (possibly) positive effect. Furthermore, individual savings decline as in-
terest rates decrease and also as individuals have less income out of which to save
due to the negative income effect. These results are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.5. A larger share of total government outlays allocated to govern-
ment consumption unambiguously decreases growth.
Proof: Recall the growth factor, equation (2.35). The elasticity of growth with
respect to the parameter φ can then be written as
gˆφ = gˆRRˆφ + gˆI Iˆφ
with
gˆR =
λσ(Rδ)σ
σ
g > 0, gˆI =
g
I
> 0, Iˆφ =
(1− κ)A˜
1+λσ
λσ
I
ˆ˜Aφ < 0,
Rˆφ =
ˆ˜Aφ < 0, and
ˆ˜Aφ = −
(1− α)φ
α(1− φ)
< 0.
Consequently, the overall effect is clearly negative.
The intuition behind this result is simple: Private income redistribution is not
capable of offsetting the negative income effects through declining real wages and
lower rates of return to savings. This is due to the fact that every generation is
hit in the same negative way by such a policy reform. In contrast to the results
found by Rivas (2003), there are no restrictions on the intertemporal substitution
elasticity; this means that private income redistribution contributes an additional
negative effect to the analysis, thereby ruling out possible positive effects.
18Analytically, it can be shown that bequests decline if the initial capital income tax rate is
sufficiently small, i.e., ∂(1− tw)wt/∂t
r > ∂Rst−1/∂t
r ⇔ tr < 1− t¯r/α. Yet, total family income
always declines due to the policy reform under consideration.
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2.4 Simulations
Since in general some of the above results have ambiguous effects on growth, this
section conducts a numerical calibration exercise using US data in order to illustrate
how the different tax policies from the preceding sections may affect growth.
Before computing these growth effects, the parameters of the model have to be
fixed. Note that one period in the model is assumed to last half a generation,
i.e., 30 years. Following Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996), the capital income share α
is fixed at 0.4. Furthermore, the parameter A˜ = Y/K is set to 12, corresponding
to a capital–output ratio of 10.59 on a quarterly basis. A is then chosen to match
Y/K = 12.
The choices of the capital and labour income tax rates are taken from Rivas
(2003) and set to 35% and 40% respectively. The first value is drawn from IRS
data, while the second one is chosen to match the average share of US total outlays
of GDP over the period 1960–1995, amounting to 38%. The corresponding average
share of government consumption expenditures of GDP is 17.4% for the same time
period.19 Accordingly, the spending composition parameter is set so that φ = 0.6.20
On the side of the households, the altruism parameter λ is adjusted to generate
a steady-state bequest–capital ratio of 43% for a given value of the intertemporal
substitution elasticity (DeLong, 2003, Fig. 2-1). Further, the individual discount
rate δ is chosen to match annual growth and after-tax interest rates of 2% and
4.8% (for given σ). With respect to the value of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption, there exists no consensus in the econometric literature.
Consequently, most studies, like Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) or Dalgaard and Jensen
(2007), assume log utilities, i.e., σ = 1.21 Since the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption is critical in determining the reaction of individual
savings, alternative scenarios with σ = 5/6 and σ = 10/7 are also included in the
analysis.22 The parameters of the model are summarized in table 2.1.
19See OECD Historical Statistics 1995.
20Note that expenditures on government transfers are not considered here. Consequently, the
value for the composition parameter is higher than the one implied by the data, i.e., φ = 0.53, for
the same time horizon as mentioned above.
21Dalgaard and Jensen (2007) justify this, observing that the empirical savings elasticity is more
or less constant. This implies that substitution and income effects offset each other, which will
only be the case if σ = 1.
22These choices again correspond to the values used by Rivas (2003), who carries out a similar
calibration exercise.
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Parameter Value Source
α 0.4 Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996)
δ Chosen to generate an annual growth rate of 2%
λ To match x = 0.43 for given σ—DeLong (2003)
A˜ 12 Matches K/Y = 10.59—Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996)
A Chosen to satisfy A˜
tr 0.35 IRS data—Hendricks (1999)
tw 0.4 Matches κ = 0.38—Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996)
φ 0.6 Matches total outlays of 22% of GDP
Table 2.1: Utilized parameter values
σ = 0.83 σ = 1 σ = 1.43
tr tw x R g ∂g/∂tr g ∂g/∂tr g ∂g/∂tr
0.35 0.4 0.43 1.048 1.020 −1.09 1.02 −1.31 1.02 −1.87
0.4 0.37 0.19 1.046 1.0189 −1.14 1.0187 −1.37 1.0182 −1.94
0.45 0.33 0 1.044 1.0184 1.97 1.0180 1.71 1.0168 1.04
0.5 0.3 0 1.042 1.0203 2.02 1.0196 1.71 1.0178 0.94
0.55 0.27 0 1.039 1.222 2.07 1.0212 1.71 1.0187 0.82
Table 2.2: Increasing the capital income tax and reducing wage taxes—the effects
on the bequest–capital ratio x, the interest factor R, the growth factor g, and its
derivative ∂g/∂tr.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 summarize the results when an increase in capital income
taxation is used either to cut wage taxes or to enhance public services, respectively,
while table 2.4 lists the results of changes in government’s spending composition
in favour of government consumption. In each table the effects of the respective
policy reform on the bequest–capital ratio x, the (annual) interest factor R, and,
for varying σ, the (annual) growth factor g, as well as its derivative with respect
to either the capital income tax (∂g/∂tr) or the spending composition parameter
(∂g/∂φ), are displayed. The first row of each table shows the benchmark case.
First, look at table 2.2. A 5-percentage-point increase of the capital income tax
allows for a reduction of the wage tax by 3%-points, while such an increase leads
to a decline of the annual interest rate by approximately 0.2%-points. As long as
bequests are operative, i.e., x > 0, growth unambiguously decreases. For example,
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σ = 0.83 σ = 1 σ = 1.43
tr κ x R g ∂g/∂tr g ∂g/∂tr g ∂g/∂tr
0.35 0.38 0.43 1.0483 1.020 0.60 1.02 0.60 1.02 0.62
0.4 0.4 0.27 1.0482 1.0205 0.38 1.0204 0.36 1.0204 0.30
0.45 0.42 0.09 1.0479 1.0207 0.15 1.0207 0.09 1.0205 −0.06
0.5 0.44 0 1.0472 1.0220 2.72 1.0219 2.61 1.0216 2.34
0.55 0.46 0 1.0462 1.0244 2.84 1.0242 2.67 1.0236 2.24
Table 2.3: Increasing the capital income tax and the share of public spending in
GDP—the effects on the bequest–capital ratio x, the interest factor R, the growth
factor g, and its derivative ∂g/∂tr.
in the case of σ = 1, a 5-percentage-point increase in the capital income tax from
35% to 40% reduces the annual growth rate by 0.13%-points. Yet, if bequests are no
longer operative, i.e., x = 0, the growth effects are reversed, and a further increase
in the capital income tax then enhances growth as in Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996).
Second, look at table 2.3. Raising the capital income tax rate by 5 percentage
points in this case allows one to increase the share of total government spending
in the GDP by 2%-points. The annual interest factor declines, and the decline
becomes more pronounced the higher the existing level of capital income taxation.23
By contrast, incremental increases of the capital income tax by 5%-points enhance
growth whether bequests are inoperative or operative. Note, however, that if x > 0
the growth effects are very small and there seems to exist a growth-maximizing tax
rate, which is, for example, between 40% and 45% for σ = 1.43.
Finally, look at table 2.4. Raising the share of public spending in government con-
sumption in favour of public services unambiguously and severely decreases annual
growth and interest rates as factor productivity declines. For example, enhancing φ
from 60% to 65% reduces the annual interest rate by 0.51%-points and the annual
growth rate (in the case σ = 1) by 0.54%-points. Yet, a 5-percentage-point increase
in φ enhances the bequest–capital ratio by 2%-points24, indicating that the negative
23Note, however, that for the chosen parameters values, the critical capital tax rate t¯r amounts
to 36%, implying that, in the benchmark case, a slight increase in tr actually increases the interest
factor.
24For the chosen parameter values, bequests would decrease as a reaction to the policy reform
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σ = 0.83 σ = 1 σ = 1.43
φ x R g ∂g/∂φ g ∂g/∂φ g ∂g/∂φ
0.6 0.43 1.0483 1.020 −4.94 1.02 −5.47 1.02 −6.83
0.65 0.45 1.0432 1.015 −4.72 1.0146 −5.12 1.0133 −6.14
0.7 0.48 1.0376 1.010 −4.48 1.0088 −4.76 1.0060 −5.45
0.75 0.5 1.0316 1.004 −4.21 1.0023 −4.37 0.9980 −4.74
0.8 0.52 1.0251 0.997 −3.91 0.9951 −3.94 0.9893 −4.02
Table 2.4: Increasing the share of spending in government consumption—the effects
on the bequest–capital ratio x, the interest factor R,the growth factor g, and its
derivative ∂g/∂φ.
income effect of the young generation is more severe than the decline in the old’s
return to savings.
What are the policy conclusions to be drawn from this calibration exercise? Of
course, the model cannot exactly mirror the situation in the US. Still, it points
to some important insights concerning the relation of capital income taxation and
growth: First, the intergenerational transfers within the family do affect this relation
and may even reverse positive results found by previous studies. Second, the real-
location of additional revenue from capital income taxation matters in determining
the sign of the growth effect. From a growth-maximizing point of view, the analysis
suggests enhancing productive government spending (e.g., investment in infrastruc-
ture) rather than lowering wage taxes. Third, shifts in the composition of total
government outlays towards unproductive spending may severely affect growth.
2.5 Welfare Effects
So far, the analysis has focused on the growth effects of increasing capital taxation
and a shift in the spending composition towards government consumption. However,
it remains unclear in which way these policy reforms affect the welfare of the living
generations, the currently young which is able to fully adjust private decision making
to fiscal policy and the presently old generation that has decided on the amount
under consideration if tr < 0.1.
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of savings, st−1, prior to any policy changes. Yet, this is of special importance in
determining the political support for any reform. To address this issue, the following
section sheds light on the questions whether a reform capable of generating a positive
growth effect additionally leads to a welfare gain for the economy and if such a gain
is still possible for a negative growth effect. To this end, the welfare effects of
the policy reforms today are evaluated for the currently young and old generation
thereby distinguishing the cases of operative and inoperative bequests.
In order to simplify the analysis, the utility function is restricted to the case
of log-utilities, i.e. σ = 1, noting that this is in line with most of the empirical
literature. The utility function (2.9) then takes the simple form
U(ct, dt+1, It+1) = ln ct + δ[ln dt+1 + λ ln It+1]. (2.39)
and the growth factors with inoperative and operative bequests, equations (2.30)
(with xt = 0) and (2.35), simplify to
gt =
δ
1 + δ
(1− tw)(1− α)A˜ (2.40)
and
gt =
Rδ
Rδ + θ
1+λ
λ
1 + λ
θ, (2.41)
respectively, with θ = (1− κ)A˜ as in the preceding section.
Inoperative bequests
First, consider the welfare effects when the economy is bequest constrained, i.e.
bt+1 = 0 in period t + 1. To derive the individual’s indirect utility function, hence-
forth denoted by Vt, one has to determine consumption, ct and dt+1, and next
period’s income, It+1. By combining equations (2.8), next period’s income in case
of inoperative bequests, and (2.21), the good market equilibrium condition, one
obtains:
It+1 = (1− t
w)(1− α)A˜Kt+1 (2.42)
dt+1 = RKt+1. (2.43)
Using the first order condition of individual utility maximization, equation (2.10),
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one then gets a simple expression for first period consumption:
ct =
1
δ
Kt+1. (2.44)
By inserting (2.42), (2.43) and (2.44) into (2.39) and simplifying terms, the individ-
ual’s indirect utility function can be written as
Vt = (1 + δ(1 + λ)) ln gt + δ lnR + δλ ln[(1− t
w)(1− α)A˜] +Mt (2.45)
where Mt is a constant that does not depend on any policy or individual decision
variables. Clearly, the welfare of a young individual of generation t is affected
through various channels: First, it depends on how growth is influenced by the
different policy reforms as analyzed in the preceding sections. Higher growth rates
unambiguously enhance welfare as output and thus also individual income, which
in turn determines consumption levels, increase. Second, the welfare of generation t
is sensitive to changes in the (after tax) interest factor. A higher return to savings
clearly increases consumption possibilities as this, other things being equal, has a
positive impact on individual’s second period income which is completely used for
consumption when bequests are inoperative. Finally, the policy reforms directly
affect future income which in turn has a positive impact on individual’s welfare level
due to the specification of the utility function and the bequest motive.
The welfare effects for the currently young generation with respect to the different
policy reforms can now be evaluated. To do so, differentiate (2.45) with respect to
tr and φ. In case of a revenue neutral tax shift, i.e. the wage tax is endogenously
determined and equation (2.28) holds, it is:
∂Vt
∂tr
=
1 + δ(1 + λ)
gt
∂gt
∂tr
+
δ
R
∂R
∂tr
−
δλ
1− tw
∂tw
∂tr
(2.46)
with ∂t
w
∂tr
= − α
1−α
< 0, ∂gt
∂tr
= δ
1+δ
(1 − α)A˜∂(1−t
w)
∂tr
> 0 and ∂R
∂tr
= −αA˜ < 0. Con-
sequently, there may be a welfare gain for the currently young generation if the
positive effects through higher growth and future income levels offset the adverse
effect stemming from a declining return to savings. As will be shown below, this
holds if the initially level of capital income taxation is sufficiently low.
When combined with an expansion in government spending, i.e. κ is now en-
dogenous and (2.14) holds, an increase in the capital income tax yields the following
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comparative static result:
∂Vt
∂tr
=
1 + δ(1 + λ)
gt
∂gt
∂tr
+
δ
R
∂R
∂tr
+
δλ
A˜
∂A˜
∂tr
(2.47)
with ∂A˜
∂tr
= 1−α
κ
A˜ > 0, ∂gt
∂tr
= δ
1+δ
t¯r ∂A˜
∂tr
> 0 and ∂R
∂tr
≷ 0 ⇔ tr ≶ t¯r. The welfare
effect is thus unambiguously positive if tr < t¯r which is, however, a by far sufficient
condition.
Finally, differentiating Vt with respect to φ gives
∂Vt
∂φ
=
1 + δ(1 + λ)
gt
∂gt
∂φ
+
δ
R
∂R
∂φ
+
δλ
A˜
∂A˜
∂φ
< 0 (2.48)
as ∂A˜
∂φ
= − 1−α
α(1−φ)
A˜ < 0, ∂gt
∂φ
= δ
1+δ
t¯r ∂A˜
∂φ
< 0 and ∂R
∂φ
= (1 − tr)α∂A˜
∂φ
< 0. Changing
the composition of government expenditures in favor of government consumption
therefore clearly reduces welfare for the currently young generation.
By contrast, the welfare effects for the currently old population are obtained by
considering the impact of the policy reforms on dt and It as these individuals can no
longer adjust to changes in the policy parameters. Rather, decisions on the amount
of savings of this generation, st−1, have been made prior to the policy reforms.
Formally the following utility function, thus, has to be analyzed:
U(ct−1, dt, It) = ln ct−1 + δ[ln dt + λ ln It] (2.49)
where ct−1 is constant and denotes consumption of a young individual born in t− 1.
Inserting (2.43) and (2.42) for period t into (2.49) and simplifying terms yields:
V oldt = lnR + λ ln((1− t
w)(1− α)A˜) + M¯t (2.50)
Clearly, a revenue neutral tax reform affects the old’s welfare in an ambiguous way:
On the one hand it reduces the after tax interest factor, thereby lowering the return
to savings and thus old-age consumption. On the other hand, however, a decreasing
wage tax enhances the disposable income of the immediate descendant which has
a welfare-enhancing effect. As will be shown below, the positive effect dominates
for a sufficiently low level of the capital income tax. Regarding the expansion of
government expenditures, financed by capital income taxation, such a policy will
unambiguously increase the old’s welfare as long as the interest rate increases which
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holds for tr < t¯r according to proposition 2.3. In this case, both old age consumption
and the disposable income of the children will be higher implying a welfare gain for
the presently old generation. Finally, shifting government expenditures from pro-
ductive resources to unproductive government consumption clearly reduces welfare
for the old as productivity and consequently also income consumption possibilities
decline.
The above results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.6. Suppose that parent’s degree of altruism is sufficiently low, i.e.
λ < λˆ. Then bequests are inoperative and a revenue neutral increase of the capital
income tax that decreases the wage tax
• enhances welfare for the presently old and the currently young generation if
the prevalent tax level is sufficiently small, i.e. tr < 1− 1−κ
(1+λ)α
≡ t˜r.
When combined with an expansion in government spending, an increase in the capital
income tax
• enhances welfare for the presently old and the currently young generation if
the prevalent tax level is sufficiently small, i.e. tr < t¯r.
A shift in government expenditures towards government consumption unambiguously
reduces welfare for all present generations.
Proof: According to proposition 2.1, bequests are inoperative, as long as λ < λˆ.
The condition for a welfare gain of the presently old generation under the revenue
neutral tax reform can be shown as follows: Taking the derivative of (2.49) with
respect to tr gives:
∂V oldt
∂tr
= −
1
1− tr
+
λα
(1− tw)(1− α)
(2.51)
Inserting the wage tax (2.28) and rearranging terms, (2.51) will be positive if and
only if tr < t˜r.
In a similar fashion, conditions for a welfare gain of the currently young genera-
tion can be derived: Straight forward calculations show that equation (2.46) will be
positive if and only if tr < 1− δ(1−κ)
1+δ(1+λ+α(1+λ))
≡ tˆr.
By comparing the critical levels t˜r and tˆr, it turns out that both living generations
will experience a welfare gain as long as tr < t˜r as t˜r < tˆr.
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Consequently, when bequests are inoperative, a revenue neutral tax reform in
favor of capital income taxation may not only increase growth but also enhance
welfare for all present generations if the level of capital income taxation is relatively
low. A similar result obtains if the increase in the capital income tax is combined
with an expansion in public expenditures: For sufficiently low levels of capital in-
come taxation, such a policy reform will have a growth- and welfare-enhancing effect,
while a shift of government expenditures from productive resources to unproductive
government consumption will not only harm growth but also reduce welfare for all
present generations.
Operative bequests
In a next step, turn to the case when bequests are operative, i.e. bt+1 > 0 in t+1. By
combining (2.10), (2.11) and (2.21), next period’s income, old-age and first period
consumption can be written as
It+1 =
λ
1 + λ
θKt+1 (2.52)
dt+1 =
1
1 + λ
θKt+1 (2.53)
ct =
1
(1 + λ)δR
θKt+1. (2.54)
Insert these expressions into (2.39) and simplify terms, to obtain the individual’s
indirect utility function
Vt = (1 + δ(1 + λ)) ln gt − lnR + (1 + δ(1 + λ)) ln θ + M˜t (2.55)
where M˜t is again a constant that does not depend on any policy or individual
decision variables. In analogy to the case of inoperative bequests, the welfare of a
young individual of generation t is sensitive to changes in the growth and interest
rate. However, while higher levels of growth clearly have a welfare enhancing effect,
increases in the return to private savings reduce welfare. This is, other things being
equal, due to the change in the relative price of consumption implying lower levels
of first period consumption. Furthermore, welfare is positively affected through
increases in productivity which in turn raises income and consequently consumption
levels as captured by θ.
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Evaluating the individual’s indirect utility function with respect to the different
policy reforms, starting with the revenue neutral tax shift, one obtains:
∂Vt
∂tr
=
1 + δ(1 + λ)
gt
∂gt
∂tr
−
1
R
∂R
∂tr
(2.56)
with ∂gt
∂tr
= −1+δ(1+λ)
1+λ
θ < 0 according to proposition 2.2 and ∂R
∂tr
= −αA˜ < 0. The
welfare effect for the young generation is thus generally ambiguous, depending on
the relative strength the policy reform exerts on the growth and interest factor. Yet,
as will be shown below, a welfare gain obtains for sufficiently large levels of capital
income taxation.
When the increase in the capital tax is instead combined with an expansion in
government expenditures, i.e. (2.14) holds, the derivative becomes
∂Vt
∂tr
=
1 + δ(1 + λ)
gt
∂gt
∂tr
−
1
R
∂R
∂tr
+
1 + δ(1 + λ)
θ
∂θ
∂tr
(2.57)
with ∂gt
∂tr
> 0 if tr < t¯r as can be inferred from (2.36) (for σ = 1), ∂R
∂tr
≷ 0 ⇔ tr ≶ 0
(proposition 2.3) and ∂θ
∂tr
= 1−α−κ
κ
A˜ ≷ 0 ⇔ tr ≶ t¯r/α where κ is determined by
(2.14). Consequently, the sign of the welfare effect is determined by the relative
strength of three (partly) opposing effects: The growth effect, the impact of the
interest factor on the individual consumption/saving decision as well as the effect
of the policy reform on individual income and the amount of bequest, as captured
by θ.
Finally, shifting government expenditures towards government consumption, one
gets:
∂Vt
∂φ
=
1 + δ(1 + λ)
gt
∂gt
∂φ
−
1
R
∂R
∂φ
+
1 + δ(1 + λ)
θ
∂θ
∂φ
(2.58)
with ∂gt
∂φ
< 0 (proposition 2.5), ∂R
∂φ
= (1 − tr)α∂A˜
∂φ
< 0 and ∂θ
∂φ
= (1 − κ)∂A˜
∂φ
< 0,
implying that the welfare effect for the currently young generation is unambiguously
negative.
In analogy to the case of inoperative bequests, one also has to analyze the welfare
effects for the currently old generation. To obtain the indirect utility function of an
individual born in t− 1, insert (2.53) and (2.52) (for period t) into the old’s utility
function (2.49) and simplify terms to reach:
V oldt = δ(1 + λ)θ + Mˆt. (2.59)
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It is easy to see that a revenue neutral tax reform does not affect the old’s welfare
as these individuals encounter any change in their old age consumption level by
adjusting private intergenerational transfers. Consequently, the amount of bequest
decreases as future income increase and old-age consumption declines. The effect
of an expansion in public expenditures, however, enhances the old’s welfare for
sufficiently low levels of capital income taxation, i.e. tr < t¯r/α. Then, the positive
income effect of higher (net) wages offsets the (possibly) negative effect on individual
income due to a reduced amount of bequest and θ increases. Clearly, as compared
to the case when bequests are inoperative, an increase in φ unambiguously reduces
welfare for the old as productivity and thus income and consumption levels decline.
The welfare implications for operative bequests are summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2.7. Suppose that parent’s are sufficiently altruistic towards their chil-
dren, i.e. λ > λˆ. Then bequests are operative and a revenue neutral increase of the
capital income tax that decreases the wage tax
• may enhance welfare of the currently young generation if the prevalent level of
capital income taxation is sufficiently high, i.e. tr > 1− 1+λ
(1+δ(1+λ))θ
.
• does not affect welfare for the presently old generation.
When combined with an expansion in government spending, an increase in the capital
income tax
• has an ambiguous effect on the welfare of the currently young generation.
• enhances welfare for the presently old generation, if the existing level of capital
taxation is sufficiently low, i.e. tr < t¯r/α.
A shift in government expenditures towards government consumption unambiguously
reduces welfare for all present generations.
Proof: According to proposition 2.1, bequests are operative, as long as λ < λˆ. The
welfare gain for the currently young generation under the revenue neutral tax reform
can be shown as follows: Inserting the derivatives of the growth and interest factor
into ∂Vt
∂tr
> 0 and rearranging terms yields:
αA˜
(1− tr)αA˜
>
1 + δ(1 + λ)
1 + λ
θ. (2.60)
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Solving this inequality for tr then proves the argument.
When bequests are operative, the welfare effects are no longer as clear cut as
in the case of inoperative bequests and generally depend on the relative strength
of how the reform affects the growth and interest factor. Still, for the revenue
neutral tax reform, there might be a welfare gain for the currently young generation
despite a negative growth effect. Thus, political support might not be lacking even
in case of declining growth rates. Moreover, such a positive welfare effect is also
likely for an expansion of public expenditures if the prevalent capital income tax
level is sufficiently low25. In this case, one has to balance the negative effect on first
period consumption through higher rates of return to savings with a positive growth
effect and higher income levels as productivity increases. However, with respect to
a change in the spending composition in favor of government consumption, there is
no scope for a welfare gain similar to the case of inoperative bequests.
To conclude, the welfare implications of the model critically depend on wether
bequests are positive or not. In the latter case, positive growth effects are accom-
panied by a welfare gain for the economy provided a sufficiently low level of capital
income taxation, while in the former one the sign of the growth and welfare effects
need not necessarily be the same.
2.6 Conclusions
The focus of the present chapter is to reexamine the relation between capital income
taxation and growth within a one-sector endogenous growth model in which inter-
generational transfers take the form of bequests within the family. In this model,
a fraction of government spending affects the productivity of private production
factors while the remaining part of total tax revenue is allocated to unproductive
government consumption. The analysis features three specific policy reforms: First,
the additional revenue from an increase of the capital income tax is used to cut
wage taxes. Second, the additional revenue is used to enhance productive govern-
ment spending. Third, the government changes the composition of total government
outlays in favor of government consumption.
The analysis extends and generalizes previous studies by Uhlig and Yanagawa
(1996) and Rivas (2003). The results of those authors are obtained if bequests are
25Note that for tr = t¯r, the welfare effect is unambiguously positive.
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inoperative and the additional revenue from capital income taxation is used either to
cut existing wage taxes or to increase the fraction of public services. In these cases,
capital income taxation may increase growth, if savings are sufficiently inelastic to
changes in the interest rate.
However, if bequests within the family are operative, individuals try to respond
to public income redistribution by adjusting private intergenerational transfers. It
is shown that this additional channel of private income redistribution overturns the
positive growth result due to the shift of the tax burden but cannot completely
offset the positive effect stemming from changes in factor productivity. Moreover,
increasing the share of government consumption of total outlays unambiguously
reduces growth.
These results are generally driven by three channels: First, they depend on
how interest rates and savings react to the respective policy reform. Second, pub-
lic income redistribution policy affects individual income and thus the individual
consumption–saving decision. Third, individuals try to offset public income redis-
tribution by adjusting private transfers. Numerical calibration results using US data
underscore the theoretical findings. Yet, in the case of operative bequests, adjusting
the tax structure as well as increasing the share of government consumption in total
outlays leads to a sharp decline in annual growth rates, while the positive impact of
increasing public services is relatively small in absolute values.
In an extension, the welfare implications of the different policy reforms are ana-
lyzed. It is found that when bequests are inoperative, positive growth effects coincide
with a welfare gain for the economy if the level of capital income taxation is not
too high. By contrast, in case of operative bequests, the welfare effects are gener-
ally ambiguous depending on the relative strength of the effects of fiscal policy on
growth and interest rates. However, a shift of government expenditures in favor of
government consumption clearly reduces not only growth but also welfare in any
case.26
The present analysis suggests at least two things: First, the presence of intergen-
erational transfers does influence the relation between taxation and growth/welfare.
26Note that this latter result is rather obvious since individuals’ utility is independent of gov-
ernment consumption. If these benefits are included into the welfare function, however, the result
does not necessarily hold as there is a trade off between higher levels of government consumption
and higher levels of taxation. Such an extension would therefore be an interesting issue of future
research.
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Consequently, one has to be cautious with possible policy implications, as these may
vary with the regime in which the economy is operating (operative versus inoperative
bequests). Second, from a growth-maximizing point of view, investing in a country’s
infrastructure seems to be superior to cutting existing wage taxes, irrespective of
the presence of private intergenerational transfers. However, if the initial state of
the economy is such that bequests are operative, extensive taxation of income from
capital may then deliver the largest gains in growth, when tax policy crowds out
private transfers within the family.
Finally, an interesting issue of future research would be to analyze the sensitivity
of the results with respect to the assumption that public expenditures enter the pro-
duction function as a flow variable. Alternatively, one could assume public capital to
be a stock variable, see, e.g., Turnovsky (1997, 2004). This, however, would further
increase analytical complexity. Moreover, the present results could be generalized
by allowing for heterogeneity in the motivation to make private transfers. Setting up
a two period overlapping-generations model where individuals are concerned about
their children’s disposable income (family altruism) and about the amount of be-
quest itself (joy-of-giving altruism), Kunze (2011) provides a comprehensive analysis
of how the pattern of capital income taxation and economic growth depends on par-
ents’ degree of altruism towards their children, which in turn determines if bequests
are operative or not, and on the relative weight of either the amount of bequest
itself or the children’s income level in the individual utility function. As a result, it
turns out that the sign of the growth effect critically depends on the relative weight
attached to the different altruistic motives and therefore on heterogeneity in the
motivation to give.
The following chapter introduces another aspect of fiscal policy in the presence
of intergenerational transfers: human capital accumulation as engine of economic
growth. While intergenerational transfers have been modeled as either exclusively
public (pensions) or private (bequests) in the previous chapters, the interplay of two
types of transfers in form of private investments into human capital and bequests
within the family will be analyzed in the following. The analysis is carried out in the
context of social security funding. Specifically, whereas the focus of the first chapter
has been on an alternative financing method of public pay-as-you-go pensions, the
next chapter examines the growth effects of a fully funded pension scheme. It turns
out that the coexistence of private educational spending and bequests generates a
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trade-off that may substantially alter the results of the existing literature.
Chapter 3
Funded social security and
economic growth
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
The relationship between social security benefits and human capital formation which
affects the productivity of future generations has recently received much attention
in the theoretical literature. By now, it is generally accepted that the solvency
of social security critically depends on the growth of future productivity as, for a
pay-as-you-go pension scheme, benefits are directly related to payroll taxes paid by
future generations whereas, for a fully funded system, the return to forced savings
depends on future labour productivity. However, as the traditional research typically
focusses on the adverse effects of social security provision for private savings and
physical capital accumulation (see e.g. Feldstein (1974)), the impact of human
capital formation for future productivity has been long ignored. Still, faster human
capital accumulation may not only serve as a counterweight to population aging but
also to the adverse effects of social security on private savings which in turn decrease
the relative share of physical capital, as has been argued by Kaganovic and Zilcha
(2008).
In view of the looming crisis of existing pay-as-you-go pension schemes, due to
the speed at which populations are aging and slow economic growth in most Euro-
pean countries, social security reform proposals are on the immediate public policy
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agenda. While some studies suggest reducing pressure on contribution rates by
taking into account alternative financing instruments such as environmental taxes
(e.g., Wendner (2001); Ono (2007)), consumption taxes (e.g., Hu (1996); Lin and
Tian (2003)) or capital income taxes (Kunze and Schuppert (2010)), most of the
existing work is concerned about the transition from an unfunded system towards
a fully funded one. In this respect, the focus of many studies is either on the
comparison of funded vs. unfunded social security systems and their performance
with growth (e.g. Docquier and Paddison (2003), Kaganovic and Zilcha (2008),
Thogersen (2010)), or on transitional issues between both pension schemes (e.g.
Belan et al. (1998), Gyárfás and Marquardt (2001)). By contrast, this chapter ad-
dresses the questions how an increase in an existing funded social security system
impacts on economic growth and whether a funded or an unfunded pension scheme
may bring about faster economic growth depending on preferences with regard to
altruism and technology.
These issues are examined within a three period overlapping generations model
with family altruism where private investment in human capital of children is the
engine of endogenous growth. Whereas fully funded pensions are completely neutral
to capital accumulation in the textbook version of overlapping generations models1,
it is by now generally believed that funded social security has a positive impact on
growth or is at least neutral (e.g. Zhang (1995), Docquier and Paddison (2003)).
In contrast to this conventional view, the current chapter demonstrates that there
is a case for a negative growth effect if altruistic parents face a trade-off between
educating their children or increasing their disposable income by leaving bequests.
In such a situation, an increase in proportional mandatory contributions reduces
the return to education and therefore speeds up capital accumulation as individuals
substitute voluntary savings for spending on education. If the direct effect of lower
educational spending outweighs the indirect effect of faster capital accumulation,
growth decreases. When bequests are inoperative, however, the present results are
in line with the existing literature, namely that funded social security is neutral to
growth as an increase in forced savings is completely offset by a decrease in voluntary
savings whereas educational choices remain unaffected.
Consequently, the neutral effect of funded social security (as in Zhang (1995) and
de la Croix and Michel (2002)) is the result of the particular assumption made on
1See de la Croix and Michel (2002).
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altruism (dynastic preferences or no altruism at all) and the way human capital is
accumulated. In this chapter, we employ the family altruism model, implying that
individuals derive utility from the disposable income of their immediate descendants,
as has been formalized by Lambrecht et al. (2006). Given this framework, it is also
shown that an unfunded pension scheme may bring about faster long-run growth
than a fully funded one when bequests are inoperative while the opposite is true
when bequests are operative.
Finally, it should be clear that the analysis focusses on changes in steady-state
balanced growth equilibria but abstract from transitional issues. Moreover, all the
results are positive, not normative, as the current research abstract from welfare
implications which are difficult do derive in the present model framework.
3.1.2 Related literature
The existing literature on social security and economic growth can be divided by
the way human capital accumulation is modeled and by the way human capital
investments are motivated.
For example, the role of both public and private investment in education in the
relationship between social security funding and economic growth was analyzed for
the case of pay-as-you-go social security by Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999). Using
a two period overlapping generations model where altruistic parents may enhance
their children’s human capital endowment by investing into private education, they
find a case for the maintenance of the social security system if and only if parents
are sufficiently altruistic and have a strong concern for retirement income. Simi-
larly, Kaganovic and Zilcha (2008) study the role of public educational funding, in
determining the impact on human capital accumulation of alternative social security
systems. It turns out that education tax rates and thus also rates of human capital
accumulation are higher under a pay-as-you-go pension scheme as compared to a
fully funded one.
Contrary, another strand of literature focusses on the growth implications of a
pay-as-you-go pension scheme and its incentives for private educational spending:
Zhang (1995) and Zhang and Zhang (1998) find that a pay-as-you-go pension scheme
can be beneficial for economic growth when there are interaction effects with fer-
tility and human capital investments. In their models parents are either concerned
about the number of children and/or the utility of their immediate descendants
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which in turn motivates altruistic transfers in form of human capital transmission.
By contrast, Sanchez-Losada (2000) assumes that private educational spending is
motivated by joy-of-giving altruism. He considers the trade-off between the accumu-
lation of physical in form of bequests and human capital and shows that unfunded
public pensions can increase growth. If human capital investment is not motivated
by altruism but instead by lifetime earnings considerations, Docquier and Paddi-
son (2003) show that the growth effect of a pay-as-you-go system is negative since
higher contributions not only reduce the need for private savings but also lowers the
discounted value of future earnings and therefore increases the cost of investing in
human capital. Finally, Lambrecht et al. (2005) analyze the effect of public pen-
sions on growth when altruistic parents can affect their children’s income through
investment in education and by leaving bequests. It turns out that an increase in
the pension level may enhance growth, in that it alleviates distortions regarding
educational choices when bequests are inoperative.
What can be concluded from theses studies is that the impact of human capital
accumulation in determining the growth effects of pay-as-you-go social security is
by now well documented and critically depends on individuals forecasting horizon,
and therefore on their ability to redistribute resources across generations, and on
the incentives such a pension scheme generates for human capital investments. By
contrast, there are only very few studies so far explicitly taking into account the
growth implications of a fully funded pension scheme. As has been argued above,
however, human capital accumulation may not only play a crucial role in assessing
the growth effects of unfunded social security but also for a fully funded system.
Notable exceptions in this field are the studies by Zhang (1995) and Docquier and
Paddison (2003) who find that, under some conditions, a fully funded pension scheme
is either neutral to growth or may even increase growth.2 While educational invest-
ments are due to lifetime earnings decisions in Docquier and Paddison (2003), they
are motivated by dynastic altruism a la Barro (1974) in Zhang (1995). By contrast,
in this chapter we assume a form of altruism that allows for a trade-off between
bequests and education as parents are concerned about the income of their adult
2Zhang (1995) considers two cases, namely when contributions are either linked to or inde-
pendent of benefits. Furthermore, he studies the various corner solutions of his model, where for
example forced savings completely crowd out private ones. Depending on these specific scenarios,
the growth effect may either be zero negative or ambiguous. For the relevant case studied in this
paper, however, when private savings are positive and contributions are linked to benefits, fully
funded pensions are neutral to growth.
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children (not for their utility), which they can affect by either educating them or
leaving a bequest3. Under this intuitive assumption, the model is more tractable
from a technical viewpoint than the recursive form of altruism advocated by Barro
(Lambrecht et al., 2005) and allows to provide a full characterization of the effect of
funded social security on economic growth.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model and
derives the growth effects of a fully funded pension scheme when bequests are either
operative or not. Section 3.3 compares the long-run growth rate under the fully
funded scheme with the outcome of an unfunded social security system. It is shown
that, in contrast to the existing literature, the relative performance of both systems
may critically depend on whether intergenerational transfers are positive or not.
Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The Model
Consider an overlapping-generations model4 with a constant population where the
size of each generation is normalized to one. Each individual lives for three peri-
ods: During childhood individuals are educated by their parents and do not make
any economic decision. In the second period of life, each individual gives birth to
one child and inelastically supplies ht efficiency units of labour, his endowment of
human capital depending on his parents’ spending on education. He receives the
market wage wt and a non-negative bequest bt from his parents. Income is spent on
consumption ct, private education et and savings st:
It ≡ (1− τ)wtht + bt = ct + et + st (3.1)
where τ is the mandatory contribution rate to the fully funded pension scheme.
During old-age, each individual allocates the return to his voluntary savings Rt+1st
plus the return to his mandatory savings, i.e. the return to the pension scheme θt+1,
to second period consumption dt+1 and to give a non-negative bequest bt+1 to his
offspring:
dt+1 = Rt+1st + θt+1 − bt+1 (3.2)
3See also Chapter 2 for further details and motivation.
4The model is taken from Lambrecht et al. (2005) who study the growth effects of a pay-as-
you-go pension scheme.
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where Rt+1 is the interest factor at t+ 1. A balanced funded social security budget
requires
θt+1 = Rt+1τwtht. (3.3)
The human capital of an individual in period t + 1 is a function of the private
investment in education, et, and the parent’s human capital, ht:
ht+1 = De
δ
th
1−δ
t = De¯
δ
tht (3.4)
where D is a scale parameter, 0 < δ < 1 is the elasticity of the education technology
with respect to private educational spending and e¯t ≡ et/ht private educational
spending per unit of human capital. Clearly, education is modeled as a private
affair in this framework. The analysis therefore does not include intragenerational
externalities and abstracts from the issue of public versus private education finance.
Rather, the model focusses on the relationship between funded social security and
privately financed human capital formation.
Individual preferences are assumed to be logarithmic and depend on first and
second period consumption and on the disposable income of the adult child:
Ut = (1− β) ln ct + β ln dt+1 + γ ln It+1 (3.5)
where 0 < β < 1, γ denotes the degree of altruism towards own children and
It+1 = (1− τ)wt+1ht+1 + bt+1. (3.6)
Each individual maximizes utility (3.5) subject to the constraints (3.1), (3.2), (3.6)
and the non-negativity of bequests bt+1 ≥ 0 by choosing ct, et, st, dt+1 and bt+1. The
first order conditions are:
∂Ut
∂st
= −
1− β
ct
+
βRt+1
dt+1
= 0 (3.7)
∂Ut
∂et
= −
1− β
ct
+
γ(1− τ)wt+1Dδe
δ−1
t h
1−δ
t
It+1
= 0 (3.8)
∂Ut
∂bt+1
= −
β
dt+1
+
γ
It+1
≤ 0 (= 0 if bt+1 > 0) (3.9)
The first equation is the standard condition over the life cycle, determining optimal
savings. The second equation determines educational investment. The utility for-
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gone from consuming less to invest more into children’s human capital equals the
utility obtained from increasing the disposable income of the child. The third equa-
tion gives the optimal amount of bequests. Bequests are positive if the marginal
utility from old-age consumption equals the marginal utility from leaving the be-
quest.
Inserting (3.7) and (3.8) into (3.9) gives
(1− τ)wt+1Dδe
δ−1
t h
1−δ
t ≥ Rt+1 (3.10)
When bequests are operative, (3.10) holds with equality and the rate of return to
private education equals the interest rate. With inoperative bequests, however, the
rate of return to private education exceeds the interest rate.
In every period t, firms produce a single output good according to a Cobb-Douglas
production function combining physical capital Kt and human capital Ht:
Yt = AK
α
t H
1−α
t (3.11)
where A > 0 is a general index of efficiency and 0 < α < 1 denotes the capital share.
Each firm maximizes profits under perfect competition, implying that production
factors are paid their marginal products:
wt = (1− α)AK
α
t H
−α
t = (1− α)Ak
α
t , Rt = αAK
α−1
t H
1−α
t = αAk
α−1
t (3.12)
where kt = Kt/Ht is the physical to human capital ratio.
In equilibrium, the market clearing conditions for capital and good market are:
Kt = st−1 + τwt−1ht−1 (3.13)
Yt = ct + st + et + dt + τwtht (3.14)
Inserting the old’s budget constraint (3.2) into the good market equilibrium condi-
tion, (3.14) becomes
dt + It = (1− τ(1− α))Ak
α
t ht (3.15)
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3.3 Dynamics and Growth Effects
Inoperative bequests
In a first step, the growth effects of a fully funded pension scheme when bequests
are inoperative in period t+ 1 are examined. Then, (3.9) and (3.15) give
It+1 = (1− τ)wt+1ht+1 = (1− τ)(1− α)Ak
α
t+1ht+1 (3.16)
dt+1 = αAk
α
t+1ht+1 (3.17)
Combining (3.7), (3.8) and (3.12) one obtains
e¯1−δt =
γδD
β
kt+1 (3.18)
For a given capital stock kt+1, an increase in proportional contributions does not
affect educational spending as there are two opposing effects that exactly cancel out:
A higher contribution rate not only lowers the perceived return to education and
therefore reduces educational spending but also impacts negatively on future incomes
which makes parents increase their educational investment in order to alleviate the
income loss of their children.
From the non-negative bequest condition (3.10) and (3.18) one can derive an
upper bound on the forced savings rate so that bequests are inoperative if the
following inequality holds
τ ≤ 1−
αγ
β(1− α)
≡ χ (3.19)
Using (3.4) and (3.18) gives
kt+1ht+1 =
β
δγ
e¯tht (3.20)
which in turn allows to determine individual savings st and consumption ct (from
(3.13), (3.7) and (3.17)):
st =
β
δγ
e¯tht − τ(1− α)Ak
α
t ht (3.21)
ct =
1− β
β
kt+1ht+1 =
1− β
δγ
e¯tht (3.22)
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Plugging (3.21) and (3.22) into (3.1) and solving for e¯t gives
e¯t =
(1− α)δγ
1 + δγ
Akαt (3.23)
The dynamics of the physical to human capital ratio kt with inoperative bequests
result from combining (3.18) and (3.23)
[
δγD
β
kt+1
] 1
1−δ
= e¯t =
(1− α)δγ
1 + δγ
Akαt (3.24)
and converge monotonically towards a steady state (k, e¯) which in turn defines a
balanced growth path. To assess the growth effect of fully funded social security with
inoperative bequests, the long-run educational spending per unit of human capital
is derived (note that the growth factor of the economy equals g = ht+1/ht = De¯
δ).
It is obtained by rearranging (3.24) in steady state:
e¯1−α(1−δ) =
δγ(1− α)A
1 + δγ
[
β
δγD
]α
(3.25)
Further inspection of equations (3.19) and (3.25) immediately reveals:
Proposition 3.1. If parent are not sufficiently altruistic towards their child, i.e.
γ < (1− α)β/α, then bequests are inoperative and a fully funded pension scheme is
neutral to growth.
The above result is in line with the existing literature, see e.g. Zhang (1995) who
assumes dynastic preferences as in Barro (1974), and would also obtain in a model
with joy-of-giving altruism where bequests in form of physical capital are absent,
see Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999). The intuition is the following: When bequests
are inoperative, the return to private education exceeds the interest rate. Therefore,
in order to finance second-period consumption, parents are forced to invest part of
their income into the lower-paying asset. In such a situation, an increase in forced
savings is completely offset by an appropriate decrease in private savings as the
return to forced savings equals the private return. Consequently, aggregate savings
and parents’ educational choices remain unaffected and a funded social security
scheme is thus neutral to growth.
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Operative bequests
This subsection studies the case when bequests are operative. Then, (3.9) holds
with equality and combining (3.9) and (3.15) gives
It+1 =
1− τ(1− α)
1 + β/γ
Akαt+1ht+1 (3.26)
dt+1 =
1− τ(1− α)
1 + γ/β
Akαt+1ht+1 (3.27)
From the assumption of non-negative bequests, bt+1 = It+1 − (1 − τ)wt+1ht+1 ≥ 0,
it follows:
τ ≥ 1−
αγ
β(1− α)
≡ χ (3.28)
where χ defines a lower bound on the forced savings rate. If parents are sufficiently
altruistic, i.e. γ ≥ (1 − α)β/α, it is χ ≤ 0 and bequests are always operative.
Combining (3.10) and (3.12) determines private educational spending per unit of
human capital, e¯t, as a function of the physical to human capital ratio:
e¯1−δt =
(1− τ)(1− α)δD
α
kt+1 (3.29)
which further implies (using (3.4)):
kt+1ht+1 =
α
(1− τ)δ(1− α)
e¯tht (3.30)
One can now determine individual savings st (from (3.13)) and consumption ct (from
(3.7) and (3.27)):
st =
α
(1− τ)δ(1− α)
e¯tht − τ(1− α)Ak
α
t ht (3.31)
ct =
(1− β)(1− τ(1− α))
α(β + γ)
kt+1ht+1 =
(1− β)(1− τ(1− α))
(1− τ)δ(β + γ)(1− α)
e¯tht (3.32)
Inserting (3.31) and (3.32) into (3.1) and solving for e¯t gives
e¯t =
γ + βτ(1− α)
(β + γ)B(τ)
Akαt (3.33)
where
B(τ) = 1 +
α
(1− τ)δ(1− α)
+
(1− β)(1− τ(1− α))
(1− τ)δ(1− α)(β + γ)
(3.34)
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and (γ+βτ(1−α))/((1− τ)B(τ)) are increasing in τ . Consequently, with operative
bequests and given stocks of physical and human capital, kt and ht, an increase
in forced savings is not completely offset by a decrease in private savings. As a
result, aggregate savings increase whereas the impact on educational spending is
negative since a higher contribution rate lowers the perceived return to education
((γ + βτ(1− α))/B(τ) is decreasing in τ).
By combining (3.29) and (3.33), the dynamics of the physical to human capital
ratio kt are obtained as
[
(1− τ)δD(1− α)
α
kt+1
] 1
1−δ
= e¯t =
γ + βτ(1− α)
(β + γ)B(τ)
Akαt (3.35)
which converge monotonically towards a steady state (k, e¯) that in turn defines a
balanced growth path. Rearranging (3.35) in steady state determines the long-
run educational spending per unit of human capital, which captures all positive
and negative effects of fully funded social security on the growth factor, i.e. g =
ht+1/ht = De¯
δ:
e¯1−α(1−δ) =
γ + βτ(1− α)
(β + γ)B(τ)
A
[
α
(1− τ)δD(1− α)
]α
(3.36)
Further analysis of (3.36) gives rise to the following proposition:
Proposition 3.2. If parents are sufficiently altruistic towards their child, i.e. γ >
(1 − α)β/α, then bequests are operative and a fully funded pension scheme unam-
biguously lowers growth if
β > β¯ =
αγ(2− α)(1 + γδ)
(1− α)(1 + γ − α(1 + γδ))
If β < β¯, however, there exists a growth maximizing size of the funded pension
scheme τˆ > χ so that an increase in forced savings reduces growth if mandatory
contributions are sufficiently large (τ > τˆ)5.
Proof: Equation (3.36) can be rewritten as
e¯1−α(1−δ) = C¯
(1− τ)α(γ + βτ(1− α))
C − τ(1− α)m
(3.37)
with C¯ =
(
α
δD(1−α)
)α
Aδ(1−α), C = α(1−δ)(β+γ)+m and m = 1+γδ− (1−δ)β.
5For example, suppose α = 0.4, δ = 0.3, β = 0.25 and γ = 0.7. Then, β¯ = 0.74 and τˆ = 0.175.
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The logarithmic derivative of ∂e¯1−α(1−δ)/∂τ then has the same sign as the function
Ψ(τ) = C(αβτ + β(1− 2τ)− γ) +m(βτ 2(1− α)2 + γ(1− ατ)))
which decreases from
Ψ(χ) =
α(β + γ)
(1− α)β
(α(1 + γδ)(α+ (1− α)(β + γ))− (1− α)β(1 + γ))
to
Ψ(1) = −α(1 + γ)(γ + (1− α)β) < 0
Depending on the sign of Ψ(χ), the growth effect will therefore either be negative or
ambiguous. It is straight forward to show that Ψ(χ) ≷ 0⇔ β ≶ β¯.
When bequests are operative, the rates of return to education and savings are
equal and individuals save to finance old-age consumption and to give a positive
amount of bequest to their child. An increase in mandatory contributions, all other
things being equal, then lowers the rate of return to education, thereby rendering
savings relatively more attractive as a means of enhancing the disposable income
of the descendant. As a result, educational spending declines which is bad for
growth. This effect is the more severe the more patient individuals are. However, as
individuals substitute voluntary savings for private educational spending to provide
a larger amount of bequest to their offspring, there is an offsetting effect since
aggregate savings increase. Faster capital accumulation in turn translates into higher
wages per unit of human capital which increases the rate of return to education. The
balance of these effects determines the overall effect of fully funded social security
on economic growth.
The above result stands in sharp contrast to the existing literature which typ-
ically finds a neutral effect if both bequests and private savings are positive and
social security benefits are linked to contributions, see Zhang (1995). Moreover,
the neutrality result would also obtain under joy-of-giving altruism if parents care
about their children’s stock of human capital and the amount of bequest itself as in
Sanchez-Losada (2000).
3.4 Funded vs. unfunded social security
This section investigates equilibria of an unfunded social security programm and
compares them with the fully funded programm in the previous section. It turns
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out that an unfunded social security system may bring about faster growth than a
fully funded one when bequests are inoperative whereas the opposite is true with
operative bequests, reflecting the different incentives these pension schemes create
for private education funding conditional on parents’ possibilities to affect their
children’s disposable income.
The fundamental difference between both pension schemes however is the exis-
tence of intergenerational transfers. While a pay-as-you-go pension scheme does
include transfers from the current working generation to retirees, a fully funded one
does not. As a result, the social security budget (3.3) for a pay-as-you-go pension
scheme becomes
θt+1 = τwt+1ht+1 (3.38)
as contributions in period t+1 are rebated to the current old. Moreover, the market
clearing conditions (3.13), (3.14) and (3.15) are now given by
Kt = st−1 (3.39)
Yt = ct + st + et + dt (3.40)
dt + It = Ak
α
t ht (3.41)
since the government does no longer accumulate wealth in form of forced savings.
Given these equations and the different meaning of τ , the model can now be solved
in an analogous manner as in the previous section (see Lambrecht et al. (2005)
for further details). When bequests are inoperative, i.e. (3.19) holds, the long run
educational spending per unit of human capital (note that the subscript ’uf’ denotes
the solution of the unfunded pension scheme) can then be derived as
e¯
1−α(1−δ)
uf = (1− α)A
(
αβ
γδD
)α
F (τ) (3.42)
where
F (τ) =
1− τ
B˜(τ)(1− (1− α)(1− τ))α
and
B˜(τ) = 1 +
1− β
γδ
+
αβ
γδ(1− (1− α)(1− τ))
By contrast, when bequests are operative, i.e. (3.28) holds, the educational spending
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per unit of human capital is given by
e¯
1−α(1−δ)
uf =
γA
B¯(τ)(β + γ)
(
α
(1− τ)δD(1− α)
)α
(3.43)
where
B¯(τ) = 1 +
1− β + α(β + γ)
δ(β + γ)(1− α)
1
1− τ
As has been shown by Lambrecht et al. (2005), an increase in unfunded social secu-
rity harms growth when bequest are operative since the sole effect of proportional
taxes is to reduce the return to human capital. When bequests are inoperative, how-
ever, there exists a growth maximizing size of the pension scheme τ¯ if individuals
are sufficiently patient, i.e.
β >
α(1 + γδ)(2− α)
1− α
(3.44)
In this case, growth increases with the size of the pension scheme if the contribu-
tion rate is sufficiently small (τ < τ¯). There are several effects working in opposite
directions. First, the provision of social security benefits increases individuals’ life-
time income and therefore allows them to increase spending on consumption and
education which is beneficial for growth. Second, an increase in proportional con-
tributions not only reduces private savings but also the return to education which
in turn slows down physical capital accumulation and decreases educational spend-
ing. Finally, there is a negative general equilibrium effect as lower levels of physical
capital accumulation translate into lower wages per unit of human capital, thereby
decreasing the return to education even further.
As will be shown in the following proposition, the sign of the growth effect from
an unfunded social security system plays a crucial role in determining whether a
fully funded or an unfunded social security system displays higher long-run growth:
Proposition 3.3.
• If parents are not sufficiently altruistic towards their child, i.e. γ < (1−α)β/α,
then bequests are inoperative and an economy with an unfunded pension scheme
brings about higher long-run growth than an economy with a fully funded system
if parents are sufficiently patient, i.e. (3.44) holds, and contributions are not
too high (τ < τ¯).
• If parents are sufficiently altruistic towards their child, i.e. γ > (1 − α)β/α,
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then bequests are operative and an economy with a fully funded pension scheme
displays higher long-run growth than an economy with an unfunded social se-
curity system.
Proof: When bequests are inoperative it is easy to see from (3.25) and (3.42) that
e¯1−α(1−δ) = e¯
1−α(1−δ)
uf if τ = 0. Therefore, as long as the contribution rate is within
the growth enhancing range for the unfunded pension scheme, growth will unambigu-
ously be higher under the latter system. When bequests are operative, however, the
above claim follows immediately by comparing (3.36) with (3.43).
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter puts some caution on conventional views about social security. Using
a one-sector endogenous growth model in which intergenerational transfers take the
form of bequests within the family and where private investment in human capital of
children is the engine of growth, the impact of a fully funded social security system
on economic growth is studied and its performance is compared to an unfunded
pension scheme. Thereby, the analysis complements and qualifies previous studies
by Lambrecht et al. (2005) and Zhang (1995), respectively.
More specifically, it is shown that a fully funded pension scheme may harm growth
when individuals face a trade-off between educating their children and increasing
their children’s disposable income by leaving bequests. In this case, an increase
in proportional mandatory contribution distorts parents’ educational choices as it
reduces the return to education so that individuals substitute private educational
spending for voluntary savings. If the reduction in private education offsets the
positive effect through faster capital accumulation economic growth declines. By
contrast, when bequests are inoperative, funded social security is neutral to growth,
in line with most of the existing literature, as an increase in forced savings is com-
pletely offset by an appropriate decrease in private voluntary savings. Furthermore,
an unfunded pension scheme may bring about faster economic growth than a funded
one, provided that bequests within the family are inoperative. Whereas funded so-
cial security does not alter the incentives to invest into children’s education in such
a situation, an unfunded system may result in higher educational spending as the
provision of old-age social security benefits enhances individuals’ lifetime income
which in turn allows them to spend more on consumption and education which is
beneficial for growth.
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The emphasis of this chapter is on the relationship between private incentives for
human capital formation and social security benefits. Though the impact of social
security on human capital investment has long been ignored in the literature, the
effects of alternative programs on future labour productivity are highly relevant in
determining the growth implications of these systems (Kaganovic and Zilcha, 2008).
Specifically, faster human capital accumulation may serve as a counterweight to
population aging and the negative incentives of old-age social security benefits for
physical capital accumulation. While several studies have recently shown that un-
funded social security may increase growth as it provides further incentives to invest
into children’s education (see e.g. Sanchez-Losada (2000); Lambrecht et al. (2005)),
the present research adds to the ongoing debate regarding the desirability of transi-
tion from pay-as-you-go social security regime to a fully funded one by providing an
additional argument against fully funded social security. However, the results crit-
ically depend on individuals’ ability to encounter public policies by redistributing
income across generations. More specifically, it turns out that operative bequests
within the family may not only overturn the neutrality of fully funded social security
with respect to economic growth but also change the relative growth performance of
alternative social security schemes. Consequently, one has to be cautious with pos-
sible policy implications, as these may vary with the regime in which the economy
is operating (operative versus inoperative bequests).
Still, the analysis suggests at least two things: first, the growth effects of pay-as-
you-go and fully funded pension schemes are not as clear cut as has been proposed by
most preceding studies, in particular when taking into account the incentives of these
systems for private human capital investments. Second, from a growth maximizing
point of view, a pay-as-you-go scheme is superior to a fully funded one if bequests
are inoperative whereas the opposite is true if bequests are operative. As a result,
the ongoing discussions regarding a transition to a fully funded system should not
only take into account the effect on private education funding as an important factor
of increasing labor productivity, but also whether private intergenerational transfers
within the family are predominantly operative or not.
Finally, as has been pointed out by Zhang (1995) and Kaganovic and Zilcha (2008)
respectively, fertility and public educational spending may be other key determinants
of the relationship between alternative social security systems and economic growth.
Therefore, an interesting issue of future research would be to analyze the sensitivity
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of the results with respect to the assumption that individuals are not only concerned
about the income of their immediate descendants but also about the number of
children and that education funding is a public instead of a private affair. Both
issues, however, would further increase analytical complexity.
So far, the focus of the analysis in the previous chapters has been on the growth
and welfare effects of various tax policies when different kinds of intergenerational
transfers are present. The next chapter, however, draws attention to another phe-
nomenon which has been on top of the agenda in recent years: fiscal decentralization.
In a similar model setup as in the present chapter, when growth is driven by the
accumulation of human capital, the implications of fiscal decentralization for growth
and welfare are discussed. The model setup features different levels of governments,
namely local and central governments. In contrast to the previous chapters, the
central government does not decide about a tax rate but instead on the amount of
education subsidies to the local governments, which is taken as an indicator of the
degree of fiscal decentralization. The analysis reveals that a system in which public
education is jointly financed by local and central governments is superior to a fund-
ing scheme where either local or central governments exclusively finance educational
investments. Moreover the proceeding chapter addresses the issue of conflicting ob-
jectives between local and central governments and its implications for growth and
welfare.
Chapter 4
Fiscal decentralization and
economic growth
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Motivation
Throughout the world, both industrialized and developing countries have tried to
restructure their public sectors by fostering fiscal decentralization in recent years.
While the prior aim of developing nations was to enhance economic efficiency as a
response to the failure of centralized planning, in particular in the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, the objectives in most industrialized nations have been
distinct.1 For example, in the United States major programs like welfare, Medi-
caid, legal services or housing have been partially delegated to the states in hope
of improving the provision of these services as local authorities are closer to the
inhabitants and therefore more sensitive to regional needs and requirements. For
similar reasons, Wales and Scotland have established their own regional parliaments
within the United Kingdom under the Blair government whereas in Italy even the
separation of the country into two independent states has been discussed. Most
recently, however, intensified tendencies towards fiscal centralization may also be
observed. Examples include the creation and expansion of the European Union as
a new top level of government within Europe or the health care reform in the US.
Consequently, the existence of these opposing forces clearly raises the question if
1See Oates (1999) for a comprehensive survey of the literature.
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fiscal decentralization is actually beneficial to economic performance or if further
decentralization may hinder economic development.
From a theoretical point of view, fiscal decentralization, in general, describes the
devolution of fiscal responsibilities of the federal government to state and local gov-
ernments, thereby allowing to increase economic efficiency. More specifically, the
provision of public goods by subnational governments is beneficial to economic effi-
ciency as individual preferences and cost differentials are likely to vary across juris-
dictions and thus render the output of regional specific levels of public goods optimal
on efficiency grounds. This argument has first been emphasized by Tiebout (1956)
in a model where highly mobile households are sorted into demand-homogenous re-
gions of residence according to their preferences. In fact, there exist two observations
supporting the argument: First, there are some basic informational imperfections.
Due to the closeness of local governments to the inhabitants of their jurisdictions,
they are much better informed about local preferences and cost conditions whereas
the central government lacks these information. Second, there are typically politi-
cal constraints that prevents the central government from providing higher levels of
public goods to some jurisdictions than others.
Despite these strong arguments in favor of fiscal decentralization, however, some
studies also point to certain drawbacks originating from higher degrees of fiscal
decentralization, e.g. the loss of scale economies and interjurisdictional tax compe-
tition in case of a mobile tax base or the inability of politicians to properly account
for interregional spillovers (see, e.g. Oates (1999)).
Consequently, as should be clear from the above explanations, fiscal decentral-
ization is a debated phenomenon with many dimensions. One particular important
dimension of fiscal decentralization, which has, however, mostly been neglected in
the economic debate so far, is economic growth. Researchers focussing on this link
have to a great deal be inspired by the work of Oates (1993) who presumes that
regional specific investments into infrastructure and human capital could enhance
an economy’s growth rate, thereby yielding a second strong argument in favor of fis-
cal decentralization. Still, these theoretical results and presumptions stand in sharp
contrast to recent empirical findings as well as the developments in favor of fiscal
centralization.
The aim of the present chapter is therefore to shed light on the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in order to further examine
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the presumptions made by Oates and, at the same time, trying to dissolve the
discrepancy between the empirical literature and economic theory.
4.1.2 Related literature
Academic research has recently focussed on the relationship between decentraliza-
tion and growth both in the empirical and in the theoretical literature.2 On the
empirical front, evidence for a positive relationship as conjectured by Oates (1993),
however, appears to be mixed. While some studies confirm the positive impact of
higher degrees of decentralization on economic growth (Lin and Liu, 2000; Akai and
Sakata, 2002; Thiessen, 2003; Stansel, 2005), others face difficulties in establishing
a positive relationship and, in fact, obtain either no dependency or a negative one
(Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Zhanga and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 1998; Xie
et al., 1999). Still, some contributions also point to the existence of an optimal
(growth-maximizing) degree of fiscal decentralization (Thiessen, 2003; Akai et al.,
2007). More specifically, the promotion of decentralization may enhance growth if
the initial level is sufficiently low, while the opposite holds when starting from large
levels of fiscal decentralization. In this case, the relationship clearly turns out to
be hump-shaped. In sum, the empirical findings critically depend on the employed
data set and estimation techniques and evidence is far from being clear.
On theoretical grounds, by contrast, there are only few papers studying the
growth-decentralization nexus. Madies and Ventelou (2005) analyze the effects of
tax base sharing on the economy’s growth path within a non co-operative game
between net tax revenue maximizing and overlapping governments (central and re-
gional). They focus on the effects which may be crucial in determining whether a
decentralized tax system may lead to higher growth rates in comparison to a cen-
tralized one. More recently, Brueckner (2006) finds a positive linkage between fiscal
federalism and economic growth by setting up an overlapping generations model in
which public-good levels are tailored to suit the differing demands and preferences
of a heterogenous population. Within this framework, a higher degree of fiscal de-
centralization then provides increased incentives to save and to invest into human
capital, thereby fostering growth. Also, Nishimura (2006) presents an endogenous
growth model in which a country is subdivided into several jurisdictions. He then
proves the existence of a critical degree of complementarity between these jurisdic-
2See Martinez-Vazques and McNab (2003) for a comprehensive survey of this topic.
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tions, determining whether fiscal decentralization is superior to fiscal centralization
in fostering economic growth. The latter case obtains if complementarity is low.
These papers provide deeper insights into the theoretical foundations for a possi-
ble non-monotonic relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth.
However, they do not explicitly derive an optimal degree, but instead focus on clar-
ifying the effects through which decentralization may affect economic growth rather
generally. By contrast, there exists only four studies so far explicitly performing
the latter task: Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Xie et al. (1999) extend the standard
Barro growth model to allow for public spending of different levels of government.
In this way, the growth maximizing spending share of a subnational government
turns out to be positive (matching the respective exponent of the Cobb-Douglas
production function), which in turn implies a growth-maximizing level of fiscal de-
centralization. Similarly, Sato and Yamashige (2005) derive the optimal degree of
fiscal decentralization in a dynamic model, depending on the economy’s initial stage
of development. Finally, Ogawa and Yakita (2009) compare growth and welfare
maximizing degrees of decentralization within a two-region model with overlapping
generations and endogenous growth and find that the growth maximizing degree
of fiscal decentralization chosen by the central government is excessive for welfare
maximizing local governments.
Likewise, the focus of the present work is on the optimal relationship between
fiscal decentralization and long-run economic growth. This issue is examined in the
context of educational funding. More specifically, three different types of education
funding schemes are considered and their outcomes are compared with respect to
growth and welfare levels. To do so, a two region endogenous growth model with
overlapping generations featuring matching grants from central to local governments
and where endogenous growth is driven by human capital accumulation which in turn
builds on private and public educational spending is set up.
In the first funding system, public education is jointly financed by local and
central governments where the amount of educational subsidies by the central gov-
ernment is taken as an indicator of fiscal decentralization. This setup is then similar
to the one analyzed by Ogawa and Yakita (2009). However, the present analysis ex-
tends their framework in two specific ways: First, it is assumed that human capital
is not only accumulated through public involvement but also through private fund-
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ing.3 This allows one to study the impact of private educational spending on the
growth-decentralization relationship. Second, it is examined how the relationship
between fiscal decentralization and growth is affected by the postulation of govern-
ments’ objectives. In Ogawa and Yakita (2009) local governments are assumed to
maximize current residents’ welfare levels while the central government cares about
the economic long run growth rate. This work, however, also considers the opposite
case, namely when local governments maximize the long run economic growth rate
while the central government is concerned about the residents’ local welfare levels.
In the second funding system, the case of complete fiscal decentralization, local
authorities completely finance regional education by means of locally collected taxes
whereas under federal funding the central government levies nation-wide taxes to
finance education in both regions. The latter case corresponds to complete fiscal
centralization. These two frameworks have been analyzed by de la Croix and Mon-
fort (2000) who compare their outcomes with respect to speed of convergence and
growth. By contrast, the focus of the present analysis lies on the performance of the
different funding schemes in terms of growth and welfare.
To sum up, the present analysis departs from previous studies in several re-
spects: First, it allows to study both the cases of partial and complete decentral-
ization whereas most preceding studies simply focus on the polar cases of complete
(de)centralization. Second, it explicitly takes into account the role of private funding
of education in determining the growth and welfare maximizing degrees of fiscal de-
centralization. Finally, the role of government objectives’ in determining the optimal
degree of fiscal decentralization is highlighted.
Using this framework the following results are obtained: First, there exists a
growth-maximizing degree of fiscal decentralization for the mixed funding scheme
which turns out to be insufficient from the viewpoint of a welfare maximizing local
government. More specifically, if the initial level of fiscal decentralization is suffi-
ciently low, the promotion of fiscal decentralization may not only enhance growth
but in addition lead to a welfare gain for local residents. Furthermore, the presence of
private educational spending increases the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization:
the more productive private spending is in fostering human capital accumulation,
the less should public educational spending be subsidized by the central government
3For the importance of private educational spending for human capital accumulation and growth
see, e.g. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999); Blankenau and Simpson (2004).
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and a higher degree of fiscal decentralization is thus optimal. Third, the comparison
of the different funding systems does not only reveal higher growth rates for the
mixed funding scheme but also (after some finite point in time) higher welfare levels
than for the federal and regional systems. This is due to the fact that the central gov-
ernment may counterbalance the suboptimal choice of the local tax rate from the
growth-maximizing perspective by promoting the degree of fiscal decentralization
which induces the local government to increase its own level of taxation. Finally,
it is shown for the mixed system that maximum growth and welfare levels may
also be achieved by altering governments’ objectives, namely by assuming growth-
maximizing local governments and a short-sighted central government caring about
regional welfare. However, in this case, any degree of fiscal decentralization between
zero and one becomes optimal as local governments may counteract any change
in the degree of fiscal decentralization and thus the public educational subsidy by
adjusting the regional level of taxation, thereby rendering the central governments
education policy ineffective.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the basic
model framework. Section 4.3 examines the mixed funding scheme and derives the
growth- and welfare-maximizing degree of fiscal decentralization while Section 4.4
describes the federal and regional funding schemes and compares their outcomes to
the mixed system. Section 4.5 focusses on the role of governmets’ objectives and
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 The Model
The model extends previous studies by Ogawa and Yakita (2009) and de la Croix
and Monfort (2000) to include private educational spending as an important deter-
minant of human capital accumulation. Furthermore, the outcomes of alternative
models of education financing are compared with respect to their growth and welfare
levels. Finally, in an extension, it is examined how the results are changed when the
objective functions of local and central governments are altered. The basic frame-
work is given by a two-region, three period overlapping generations model where a
subscript i(= 1, 2) denotes the region while t(= 1, 2, ...) refers to the time period.
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4.2.1 Production
In each region i, a large number of identical firms produce a homogenous output
good under perfect competition. The production of a representative firm in period
t is represented by the following Cobb-Douglas type production technology with
constant returns to scale
Yi,t = K
α
i,tL
1−α
i,t (4.1)
where Ki,t and Li,t are the physical capital and effective labour employed in region
i at date t and α ∈ (0, 1). Profit maximization under perfect competition implies
that the marginal product of human and physical capital equals the wage wi,t and
interest rate Rt(= 1 + rt), respectively:
wi,t = (1− α)K
α
i,tL
−α
i,t = (1− α)k
α
i,t (4.2)
Rt = αK
α−1
i,t L
1−α
i,t = αk
α−1
i,t (4.3)
where ki,t = Ki,t/Li,t is the physical capital to effective labour ratio of region i in
period t.
Throughout this chapter, it will be assumed that population size is assumed to be
constant and normalized to one. Consequently, the labour market clearing condition
implies that the amount of effective labour used in the production process equals
the per capita human capital stock, henceforth denoted by hi,t, in region i at period
t, i.e. Li,t = hi,t. Furthermore, labour is assumed to be immobile whereas capital is
completely free to move across regions, implying the equalization of regional capital-
labour ratios and thus also of wages per unit of human capital, i.e. ki,t = kt and
wi,t = wt for i = 1, 2.
4.2.2 Households
Each individual lives for three periods. During the first period of life, when young,
individuals are completely passive and do not make any decisions. They benefit
from educational spending and accumulate their own stock of human capital in the
region of residence. Their consumption is fully included in their parents’ consump-
tion. During the second period of life, when adult, each individual inelastically
supplies hi,t efficiency units of labour to regional firms, his endowment of human
capital depending on the amount of public educational spending and on his parents’
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spending on education. An individual receives the market wage wi,thi,t
4 which con-
stitutes his sole source of income when young. Adults distribute this income among
own consumption ci,t, private educational spending xi,t and savings si,t:
(1− τi,t − τc,t)wi,thi,t = ci,t + xi,t + si,t (4.4)
where τi,t and τc,t are the income tax rates set by the local and central government,
respectively, as will be further explained below. During old-age, second period con-
sumption di,t+1 is financed by savings and their proceeds Rt+1si,t. Old individuals
completely consume their income and nothing is bequeathed. Second period’s bud-
get constraint is thus
di,t+1 = Rt+1si,t (4.5)
The human capital of an individual of region i in period t+1 is a function of his
parents’ private educational spending, xi,t, the public investment in education, ei,t,
his parents’ human capital, hi,t, and the other region’s stock of human capital, hj,t:
hi,t+1 = Be
θ
i,tx
η
i,t(hi,t + ǫhj,t)
1−θ−η (4.6)
where B is a scale parameter and 0 < θ, η < 1, with θ + η ≤ 1, are the elasticities
of the technology of education with respect to spending on private and public edu-
cational spending, respectively. The specification of the human capital production
technology in (4.6) features two types of spill-over: First, there is a local externality
as part of the adults regional human capital hi,t is inherited by the young individuals.
Second, there also exist cross-regional spill-over effects since an individual’s stock of
human capital hinges on the other region’s stock hj,t, thereby introducing conver-
gence force into the model. The strength of this latter externality is parameterized
by the parameter 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, capturing the possibilities of knowledge transmission
between regions.
Furthermore, private and public human capital expenditures are clearly modeled
as complements. This modeling captures the fact that a large part of public expen-
ditures finance primary and secondary education while private expenditures are pre-
dominantly used to finance college education and on-the-job-training (Kaganovich
and Zilcha, 1999; Blankenau and Simpson, 2004). Consequently, public expendi-
4Thus, wi,t is the wage rate per efficiency unit of labour in region i at period t.
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tures ensure the acquisition of general skills whereas private educational spending
is to obtain more specific training and skills. A combination of both types of skills
then contributes to the human capital accumulation of future generations.
Individual preferences are assumed to be logarithmic and depend on life-cycle
consumption levels and on next period’s stock of human capital in order to provide
individuals with an incentive to invest into private educational spending. Conse-
quently, the life-cycle utility function of an individual living in region i and born in
period t is
U(ci,t, di,t+1, hi,t+1) = ln ci,t + β ln di,t+1 + λ lnhi,t+1 (4.7)
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor and λ denotes the degree of altruism towards
the own child which is expressed via the offspring’s human capital. Due to the
positive correlation between human capital and future earnings, this specification
assumes that parents care about the quality or the economic success of their children
as measured by the children’s lifetime income, an idea originally developed by Becker
and Tomes (1979).
Each individual maximizes utility subject to the constraints (4.4), (4.5), (4.6)
and the non-negativity of private educational spending xi,t ≥ 0 by choosing ci,t, si,t,
di,t+1 and xi,t. Assuming interior solutions, one obtains:
ci,t =
1
1 + β + λη
(1− τi,t − τc,t)wi,thi,t (4.8)
si,t =
β
1 + β + λη
(1− τi,t − τc,t)wi,thi,t (4.9)
xi,t =
λη
1 + β + λη
(1− τi,t − τc,t)wi,thi,t (4.10)
di,t+1 =
β
1 + β + λη
Rt+1(1− τi,t − τc,t)wi,thi,t (4.11)
From equation (4.10) it is easy to see that the amount of private educational spending
critically depends on its output elasticity with respect to human capital, namely η.
Clearly, an increase in η enhances private educational spending, whereas there is no
private funding if η is zero and private spending therefore does not contribute to
the process of human capital accumulation. In this case, the model is equivalent
to the one used by Ogawa and Yakita (2009). In the following analysis, the main
interest is therefore to study the impact of private educational spending on the
decentralization-growth relationship by focussing on changes in this parameter.
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Making use of equations (4.8)-(4.11) the regional indirect utility function can be
written as
Vi,t = (1 + β + λη) ln[(1− τi,t − τc,t)wi,thi,t] + θλ ln ei,t +Mi,t (4.12)
where Mi,t is a constant satisfying
Mt = λ lnB+λη ln(λη)+β ln(βRt+1)−(1+β+λη) ln(1+β+λη)+(1−θ−η)λ lnhi,t.
4.2.3 Government
There are two types of governments in the model, a local government in each region
as well as a central government. Following Ogawa and Yakita (2009), the case in
which local governments are assumed to maximize their residents’ utility is analyzed
in a first step. To do so, each local government sets an income tax rate τi,t in
order to finance local public education ei,t. Consequently, local government’s budget
constraint amounts to
ei,t = τi,twi,thi,t + Ti,t (4.13)
where Ti,t is the transfer made by the central government. The transfer is assumed
to take the form of an education subsidy from central to local governments:
Ti,t = (1− δ)ei,t. (4.14)
where 0 ≤ 1 − δ ≤ 1 denotes the matching grant rate for local public education.
In the following analysis, δ is taken as a measure of fiscal decentralization since it
represents the autonomy of local governments in financing their own budgets. For
example, the higher δ, the less local governments depend on fiscal assistance through
the central government. In particular, the cases δ = 1 and δ = 0 correspond to com-
plete fiscal decentralization and centralization, respectively, and will be discussed in
greater detail below.5
In order to finance these subsidies, the central government raises a uniform income
5Note that, from a theoretical point of view, it would also be possible to allow for δ > 1. Then,
the central government would effectively tax local educational spending, a case which is, however,
outside the scope of the present analysis.
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tax rate τc,t. The corresponding budget constraint is then given by
τc,t(w1,th1,t + w2,th2,t) = (1− δ)(e1,t + e2,t) (4.15)
It is further assumed that the central government’s objective is to maximize the
nation-wide growth rate by choosing the appropriate level of the matching grant.
However, the assumptions about governments’ objectives will be altered in an ex-
tension to demonstrate how the results are affected by these specific assumptions.
In any way, the objectives of local and central governments do not coincide which
seems to be a realistic feature of real world economies, capturing possible tradeoffs
between fiscal decentralization and growth.
4.3 Alternative education funding systems
4.3.1 Mixed funding scheme (MF)
Throughout this section assume 0 < δ < 1 which means that both the central and
the local government have an active role in the economy and contribute to some
extend to financing educational spending. Given this restriction, it is analyzed how
the presence of private educational spending affects the relationship between fiscal
decentralization, growth and welfare in equilibrium. The results of this section will
closely be discussed against the two polar cases of complete federal (δ = 0) and
regional (δ = 1) funding below and their outcomes will be compared with respect
to growth and welfare levels.
To start with the analysis, first turn to the optimal choice of the welfare maxi-
mizing local government. Maximizing residents’ utility (4.7) subject to
ei,t =
1
δ
τi,twi,thi,t (4.16)
gives the welfare maximizing level of taxation in region i as
τi,t =
θλ(1− τc,t)
1 + β + λ(η + θ)
. (4.17)
Inserting (4.17) into (4.16) and making use of the government’s budget constraint
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(4.15), the tax rate of the central government is given by
τc,t =
θλ(1− δ)
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
. (4.18)
Finally, the equilibrium tax rate set by the local government amounts to
τi,t =
θλδ
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
. (4.19)
From this equation, it can easily be inferred that ∂τi,t/∂δ > 0 and ∂τi,t/∂η < 0.
These comparative static results are summarized in a first proposition:
Proposition 4.1. The welfare maximizing tax rate for the local government is
(i) increasing in the degree of fiscal decentralization
(ii) decreasing in the output elasticity of human capital with respect to private
educational spending.
A large transfer system (a lower δ) reduces local governments’ incentives to raise
their own revenues by setting higher tax rates. Rather, they anticipate that in-
creased public spending on education requires a larger central government tax rate
which in turn provides inducements to lower the overall tax burden by alleviating
local levels of taxation. By contrast, as can be inferred from part (ii) of the above
proposition, local governments will set lower taxes the more important private edu-
cational spending is in fostering human capital accumulation. In this case, a lower
tax rate leaves individuals with more income out of which to fund their educational
spending. Consequently, when compared to the related model where private spend-
ing on education is absent (η = 0), local tax rates will unambiguously lower to
account for the positive impact of private educational spending on human capital
accumulation.
Note further that local governments are assumed to be short-sighted as they set
the local tax rate to balance the tradeoff between the positive utility effect through
higher levels of public education with the negative effects stemming from lower levels
of consumption, savings and private education funding, thereby ignoring the impact
of educational spending on long-run capital accumulation. This assumption may be
justified as we implicitly assume a majority voting process to determine the local
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level of taxation.6
In a next step, following de la Croix and Monfort (2000), the dynamics of the
model in terms of three variables, the capital-labour ratio, kt, the ratio of workers’
consumption in region 2 to that in region 1, zt = c2,t/c1,t, as well as the growth
factor in region i, gi,t = hi,t+1/hi,t are analyzed. As, in equilibrium, wages and tax
rates are identical across regions, zt is also a measure of the ratio of regional human
capital, zt = h2,t/h1,t. To see how zt evolves over time, substitute (4.2), (4.10),
(4.16) into (4.6) to obtain the dynamic equations of the stock of human capital in
each region:
h1,t+1 = Be
θ
1,tx
η
1,t(h1,t + ǫh2,t)
1−θ−η
= B[ληδ]η[θλ]θ
[
(1− α)kαt
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
]θ+η
h1,t(1 + ǫzt)
1−θ−η (4.20)
h2,t+1 = Be
θ
2,tx
η
2,t(h2,t + ǫh1,t)
1−θ−η
= B[ληδ]η[θλ]θ
[
(1− α)kαt
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
]θ+η
h2,t(1 + ǫz
−1
t )
1−θ−η (4.21)
Dividing (4.21) by (4.20) then determines the dynamics of the regional human capital
differential:
zt+1 =
h2,t+1
h1,t+1
=
h2,t(1 + ǫz
−1
t )
1−θ−η
h1,t(1 + ǫzt)1−θ−η
= zt
(
1 + ǫz−1t
1 + ǫzt
)1−θ−η
(4.22)
The growth factor of region 1 (2) is obtained from dividing equation (4.20) ((4.21))
by h1,t (h2,t), respectively:
g1,t =
h1,t+1
h1,t
= B[ληδ]η[θλ]θ
[
(1− α)kαt
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
]θ+η
(1 + ǫzt)
1−θ−η (4.23)
g2,t =
h2,t+1
h1,t
= B[ληδ]η[θλ]θ
[
(1− α)kαt
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
]θ+η
(1 + ǫz−1t )
1−θ−η (4.24)
Finally, to see how the capital-labour ratio evolves over time, divide the aggregate
stock of physical capital, which, according to the capital market clearing condition,
is given by the sum of individual regional savings, i.e. Kt+1 = s1,t+ s2,t, by the sum
6In fact, this assumption ensures analytical tractability as it rules out any tax competition
between local regions.
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of regional human capital stocks, h1,t+1 + h2,t+1, to reach
kt+1 =
βδ1−η
B[λη]η[θλ]θ
[
(1− α)kαt
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
]1−η−θ
1 + zt
(1 + ǫzt)1−θ−η + zt(1 + ǫz
−1
t )
1−θ−η
(4.25)
The dynamics of the model are completely described by equations (4.22), (4.23),
(4.24) and (4.25). From (4.22) it can easily be inferred that the interregional differ-
ential converges monotonically towards a steady state, namely zt+1 = zt = z = 1,
so that the capital-labour ratio and the growth factor will also converge to a steady
state.
Given these findings, the policy choice of the growth maximizing central govern-
ment in the steady state, where zt+1 = zt = 1 and kt+1 = kt = k, can now be
examined. To do so, derive the long-run growth rate of the economy as follows.
Making use of the above equations, the steady state capital-labour ratio from (4.25)
is given by
k =
{
βδ1−η
B(λη)η(θλ)θ(1 + ǫ)1−θ−η
[
1− α
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
]1−θ−η} 11−α(1−θ−η)
(4.26)
The long run growth factor g can then be obtained by inserting (4.26) together with
zt = 1 into (4.23) or (4.24):
gMF = Ψδ
η+αθ
1−α(1−θ−η)
[
1− α
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
] θ+η
1−α(1−θ−η)
(4.27)
where
Ψ = β
α(θ+η)
1−α(1−θ−η) (B(λη)η(θλ)θ(1 + ǫ)1−θ−η)
1−α
1−α(1−θ−η)
Taking the first derivative of the growth factor with respect to δ gives
Sign
[
∂gMF
∂δ
]
= Sign
[
η + αθ
δ
−
(θ + η)(1 + β + λη)
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
]
. (4.28)
Solving the above equation for δ, the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization, δ∗, is
obtained as
δ∗ =
λ(η + αθ)
(1− α)(1 + β + λη)
(4.29)
This gives rise to the following proposition:
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Proposition 4.2. (i) There exists a growth maximizing degree of fiscal decen-
tralization δ∗ so that increasing fiscal decentralization may enhance growth for
δ < δ∗ while it reduces growth when δ > δ∗.
(ii) Suppose that λ < 1+β
αθ
. Then, an increase in the output elasticity of private
educational spending increases the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization, i.e.
∂δ∗/∂η > 0.
Two remarks are in order. First, the above result clearly extends the so called
Barro rule (see Barro (1990)), according to which the growth-maximizing level of
taxation equals the production share of the accumulated factor ensuring the en-
dogenous growth process. In this model, the sum of both tax rates set by the local
and central government amounts to7 τ ∗i,t+ τ
∗
c,t =
θ
θ+η
(1−α) which is unambiguously
lower than the corresponding production share if private educational spending is
positive (η > 0). Such deviation stems from the fact that the negative impact of
higher taxation on capital accumulation and private educational spending must be
balanced with the positive effect resulting from increased spending on public spend-
ing in fostering human capital accumulation. Second, with respect to the impact of
private educational spending in determining the growth-maximizing degree of fis-
cal decentralization, the above proposition shows that the more productive private
spending is in fostering human capital accumulation, the less should public educa-
tional spending be subsidized by the central government so that a higher degree of
fiscal decentralization becomes optimal. This, however, only holds if parents’ degree
of altruism and therefore the prevalent level of private spending is sufficiently low
as, then, the (possibly) positive effects of a higher output elasticity on the level of
private spending and the equilibrium capital stock exceed the negative effect on the
level of public educational funding.
In a next step, growth and welfare maximizing levels of fiscal decentralization will
be compared. As local and central governments have different objectives, the growth
maximizing level of fiscal decentralization δ∗ set by the central government must be
suboptimal from the perspective of the local welfare maximizing government. More
specifically, the question is whether such level will be excessive or insufficient for
local welfare. To address this issue, the regional indirect utility at the steady state
7To see this, substitute (4.29) into (4.19) and (4.18), respectively.
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equilibrium is derived as follows:
V ∗,MFt = ln c
∗
t + β ln d
∗
t+1 + λ lnh
∗
t+1
= (1 + β + λη + (1− η)κ) ln δ + t(1 + β + λ) ln gMF
− (1 + β + λ(θ + η) + (1− θ − η)κ) ln(θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)) + M¯ (4.30)
where
κ =
(1 + β)α+ β(α− 1) + λα(θ + η)
1− α(1− θ − η)
, (4.31)
M¯ = (1 + β + λη) ln(1 + β + λη) + θλ ln(θλ) + κ ln
(
β(1− α)1−η−θ
B(λη)η(θλ)θ(1 + ǫ)1−η−θ
)
(4.32)
and c∗t , d
∗
t+1 and h
∗
t+1 denote the steady state levels of consumption and the stock of
human capital, respectively8. Taking the derivative of (4.30) with respect to δ gives
∂V ∗,MFt
∂δ
=−
1 + β + λ(θ + η) + (1− θ − η)κ
θλ+ δ(1 + β + λη)
(1 + β + λη)
+
1 + β + λη + (1− η)κ
δ
+ t(1 + β + λ)
1
gMF
∂gMF
∂δ
(4.33)
Clearly, regional welfare is affected by all factors impacting on individuals’ consump-
tion and education levels, as well as through changes in the growth factor. However,
when evaluating (4.33) at δ = δ∗, the growth effect will be zero, i.e ∂gMF/∂δ = 0.
In this case it is
Sign
[
∂V ∗,MFt
∂δ
]∣∣∣∣∣
δ=δ∗
= Sign
[
θ(1 + β + λη)(1 + αβ)(1− α)
λ(θ + η)(θα+ η)
]
> 0. (4.34)
Proposition 4.3. The degree of fiscal decentralization for growth-maximization is
insufficient from the viewpoint of a welfare maximizing local government.
Due to the shortsightedness of local governments with respect to the time horizon
and interregional externalities, they do not take into account the positive effect
of educational spending on long-run capital accumulation when setting the local
tax rate. Consequently, welfare and growth maximizing levels of local taxation
decouple and the optimal tax rate chosen by the local government turns out to
be insufficient from the perspective of the growth maximizing central government.
8The steady state levels of consumption and human capital are obtained by evaluating (4.8),
(4.11) and (4.20) at the steady state, specifically, by inserting (4.18), (4.19), (4.26), h∗t = h0g
t and
z = 1 where needed.
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However, the central government may counteract this dilemma by promoting fiscal
decentralization which in turn increases the local level of taxation.
Furthermore, according to the above proposition, the promotion of fiscal decen-
tralization, provided an initial low level, i.e. 0 < δ < δ∗, may not only enhance
growth but in addition lead to a welfare gain for the residents. By contrast, if the
prevalent level of fiscal decentralization is sufficiently large, i.e. 0 < δ∗ < δ, there
is a tradeoff between lower levels of growth but (possibly) higher residents’ welfare
levels. Viewed from the opposite side, the promotion of fiscal centralization seems
to be superior in this case.9
So far, the focus of the analysis was on a mixed funding system. It has been
shown that there exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralization and how this
degree should be adapted to the presence of private educational spending. However,
to further assess the relevance of this setting, the outcome of the mixed funding
system with the two polar cases of complete fiscal (de)centralization regarding their
implications for growth and welfare will be compared.
4.3.2 Federal funding (FF) and regional funding (RF) schemes
For δ = 0, education is completely financed by the central government, correspond-
ing to the case of complete fiscal centralization. The federal government levies a
common, nation-wide income tax which is determined by means of majority voting
at the regional level to maximize local welfare as in the preceding section. Tax
revenues, however, are equally shared between the two regions, reflecting the cen-
tral government’s inability to discriminate against one region by providing regional
specific levels of education. Consequently, it is:
et =
1
2
τc,t
∑
i=1,2
wi,thi,t (4.35)
9Interestingly, these implications are exactly the opposite of what has been shown by Ogawa
and Yakita (2009): They consider a net equalization scheme in form of an equalization transfer and
find that the promotion of fiscal decentralization will increase growth but reduce welfare, provided
that fiscal decentralization is initially low. Consequently, though the maximum growth rate and
the welfare level under the net equalization scheme and the mixed funding system considered here
may be identical, policy implications still turn out to be different.
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and τi,t = 0. The outcome of the majority voting process, i.e. maximization of
(4.12) with respect to τc,t, is
τc,t =
θλ
θλ+ 1 + β + λη
(4.36)
Using the same procedure as in the preceding section, the growth factor of both
regions and the regional indirect utility at the steady state are obtained as:
g∗,FF = Ψ
(
1− α
1 + β + λ(η + θ)
) η+θ
1−α(1−θ−η)
(4.37)
and
V ∗,FFt = M¯ − (1 + β + λ(θ + η) + (1− θ − η)κ) ln(1 + β + λ(θ + η))
+ t(1 + β + λ) ln g∗,FF (4.38)
with Ψ, κ and M¯ as above.
Now, have a look at the case δ = 1. Then, education is completely financed at
the local level which corresponds to the case of complete fiscal decentralization.
Therefore, regional education funding only rests on regional resources and may thus
differ across regions. Local tax rates are, again, determined by means of a majority
voting process. Consequently, it is:
ei,t = τi,twi,thi,t (4.39)
and τc,t = 0. The optimal regional tax rate is given by
τi,t =
θλ
θλ+ 1 + β + λη
(4.40)
The growth factor of both regions and the regional indirect utility at the steady
state are obtained as:
g∗,RF = Ψ
(
1− α
1 + β + λ(η + θ)
) η+θ
1−α(1−θ−η)
(4.41)
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and
V ∗,RFt = M¯ − (1 + β + λ(θ + η) + (1− θ − η)κ) ln(1 + β + λ(θ + η))
+ t(1 + β + λ) ln g∗,RF (4.42)
where Ψ, κ and M¯ are the same constants as before.
Comparing the growth factors of the different systems, equations (4.27), (4.37)
and (4.41), yields:
Proposition 4.4. The equilibrium with federal funding has the same growth fac-
tor as the equilibrium with regional funding. The equilibrium with mixed funding,
however, displays higher equilibrium growth, i.e.
g∗,FF = g∗,RF < g∗,MF (4.43)
Proof: To show the above inequality note that g∗,RF ≷ g∗,MF is equivalent to
(
1
1 + β + λ(η + θ)
)η+θ
≷
(
λ(η + αθ)
(1− α)(1 + β + λη)
)η+αθ (
1− α
λ(η + θ)
)η+θ
The minimum of the expression on the left hand side with respect to α equals
min
α∈[0,1]
[(
λ(η + αθ)
(1− α)(1 + β + λη)
)η+αθ (
1− α
λ(η + θ)
)η+θ]
=
(
1
1 + β + λη
)η+θ
From these equations it is easy to see that the inequality holds.
The equality of the equilibrium growth factor with regional and federal funding
has already been shown by de la Croix and Monfort (2000) in a model without pri-
vate educational spending. The intuition behind this result is the following: After
convergence of both regions to the steady state, federal and regional system are
equivalent as the fiscal spill-over incorporated in the federal funding system is no
longer operative. Rather, both regions end up with the same stock of human capital.
This of course also holds for the mixed funding system.10 The important difference
between the mixed funding and the regional/federal funding system, however, is
10Note, that the present analysis does not explicitly consider the speed of convergence towards
the steady state of each system, but instead focuses on the long run growth and welfare effects.
Nevertheless, there may be trade offs between long-run growth and short-run convergence as has
been shown by de la Croix and Monfort (2000) and also Ogawa and Yakita (2009).
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the number of policy instruments that governments may decide on: While in the
regional and federal funding system the local and central government’s tax rate, re-
spectively, is set in order to maximize local welfare levels, which in turn ultimately
determine the long-run growth rate, central and local government’s policy variables
are chosen to comply with different objectives in the mixed funding system. There-
fore, the central government may counterbalance the suboptimal choice of the local
tax rate from the growth-maximizing perspective by promoting the degree of fiscal
decentralization which induces the local government to raise its own level of taxa-
tion. This, eventually, leads to the superiority of the mixed funding system with
respect to the growth rate.
In a next step, the different models are compared regarding their long-run welfare
implications. Inspection of equations (4.30), (4.38) and (4.42) shows:
Proposition 4.5. There exists a date t∗ so that for all t ≥ t∗ the regional indirect
utility at the steady state for the equilibrium with mixed funding will be higher than
the equilibria with federal and regional funding which are identical, i.e.
V ∗,FFt = V
∗,RF
t < V
∗,MF
t (4.44)
Proof: Rearranging the inequality V ∗,RFt ≷ V
∗,MF
t yields
(1 + β + λη + κ(1− η)) ln
(
θλ+ δ∗(1 + β + λη)
δ∗(θλ+ β + λη)
)
+ θ(λ− κ) ln
(
θλ+ δ∗(1 + β + λη)
δ∗(θλ+ β + λη)
)
+ t(1 + β + λ) ln
(
g∗,RF
g∗,MF
)
≷ 0
The first expression on the left hand side is positive while the sign of the second
one is ambiguous. Due to proposition 4.4 the third expression is always negative.
Noting that the left hand side of the above equation is monotonically declining in
t and defining t∗ as the smallest number for which the above expression holds with
equality, then proves the argument.
In the steady state, not only the growth factors of the federal and regional funding
systems are equal, but also the welfare levels. The intuition is the same as before:
After both systems have converged to the steady state, the stocks of human capital
are identical and so are consumption levels and savings. Comparing these outcomes
with the mixed funding system, however, shows that there is a trade off between
the level of welfare and its growth rate: Though welfare may be higher in the
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short run for the federal and regional system, the mixed funding scheme exhibits
higher welfare growth as has been shown in the preceding proposition. Therefore,
there exists a finite point in time after which steady state welfare will be higher
in the latter system for all subsequent periods. This possible trade off mirrors the
conflicting objectives under mixed funding: While levels of taxation in the federal
and regional system are exclusively chosen to maximize the local level of welfare, the
growth-maximizing central government negatively affects this choice in the mixed
funding system by taking into account the obvious interrelations of higher taxes on
the growth process, thereby rendering the choice at the local level suboptimal (as
compared to the alternative funding schemes) from the perspective of local welfare
maximization.
To sum up, the mixed funding system is not only superior to the alternative
schemes with respect to the growth performance but also regarding the long-run wel-
fare levels (after some finite period of time). Consequently, a certain degree of fiscal
decentralization is always superior to the cases of complete fiscal (de)centralization.
Moreover, it has been shown that there exists indeed a critical degree of fiscal decen-
tralization, delivering the highest growth performance, which is however insufficient
from the viewpoint of the welfare maximizing local government. The next section
examines to what extend the results depend on the assumptions about governments
objective functions.
4.4 Remarks on governments’ objectives
So far, a situation in which short-sighted local governments care about their res-
idents’ welfare level by setting the local tax rate while the central government’s
objective was to maximize the long-run economic growth rate by adjusting the de-
gree of fiscal decentralization has been considered. However, these assumptions are
somewhat arbitrary and one can well imagine the opposite scenario, namely a short-
sighted central government choosing decentralization levels in order to maximize the
welfare of the residents within the different regions and a local growth maximizing
government deciding about the tax rate. Therefore, the aim of this section is to high-
light the role of government objectives in determining the growth-decentralization
relationship.
Accordingly, the local government maximizes the economic long-run growth rate
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with respect to the local tax rate τi,t. Using the same procedure as in the preceding
section, the optimal solution is obtained as
τi,t =
θ
θ + η
(1− α)δ (4.45)
The growth maximizing level of local taxation is determined by the balance of two
opposing effects: On the one hand, a larger tax rate reduces the disposable income
of local residents and therefore savings, consumption levels and private educational
spending decline. This in turn diminishes human capital accumulation and thus
growth. On the other hand, however, public educational spending is increasing in the
local level of taxation. Consequently, a higher tax rate fosters the process of human
capital acquisition and growth. Furthermore, the growth maximizing local tax rate is
positively related to the degree of fiscal decentralization, which captures the negative
effect of lower central public education funding through a smaller matching grant
rate on the local level of taxation. However, from substituting (4.45) into the regional
indirect utility function (4.12) and making use of (4.15) and (4.16), one obtains
Vi,t(δ) = const (4.46)
Therefore, as can be formally inferred from the above equation, any degree of fiscal
decentralization between the two polar cases of complete fiscal centralization and
decentralization, i.e. 0 < δ < 1, turns out to be welfare maximizing for the mixed
funding system. The intuition behind this result is the following: An increase in
the degree of fiscal decentralization δ leaves the total tax burden unaltered as the
opposing effects of a higher growth maximizing local level of taxation and a lower
central government’s tax rate exactly cancel out. Similarly, the level of local public
educational funding remains unchanged when δ increases. In this case, the positive
effect of larger local education funding is offset by the direct negative effect stemming
from the reduction of the matching grant rate. Consequently, a change in the degree
of fiscal decentralization does not alter an individual’s regional welfare level. The
findings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4.6. Assume that the central government maximizes current residents’
utility while the local government cares about the long-run growth rate. Then, in
equilibrium, any degree of fiscal decentralization between zero and one turns out to
be optimal, i.e. 0 < δ∗ < 1.
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Similarly to the preceding section, the central government can affect the local
government’s decision about the tax rate by changing the degree of fiscal decen-
tralization. However, such decision becomes completely obsolete with respect to
governments’ objectives as the local government counteracts any decrease in the
matching grant rate by adjusting its own level of taxation, thereby keeping the total
tax burden and the level of local public education funding unchanged. Thus, an
increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization has no impact on regional welfare
levels.
Despite the fact that the local government can render each decision of the central
government about the degree of fiscal decentralization ineffective, it is not clear
which scenario of governments’ objective functions leads to a better performance in
terms of maximum attainable growth and indirect steady state level of utility. To
answer this question, the maximum growth factor and the steady state utility level
are derived as follows:
g∗ = Ψ
(
1− α
λ
) (1−α)θ
1−α(1−θ−η)
(
1− α
η + θ
) η+θ
1−α(1−θ−η)
(
η + αθ
1 + β + λη
) η+αθ
1−α(1−θ−η)
(4.47)
and
V ∗t = κ ln
(
β(1− α)1−η−θ
B(λη)η(1 + ǫ)1−η−θ(1 + β + λη)1−η
)
(4.48)
+ (1 + β + λη + κ(1− η)) ln
(
η + αθ
η + θ
)
(4.49)
+ (λ− κθ) θ ln
(
θ
θ + η
(1− α)
)
+ t(1 + β + λ) ln g∗ (4.50)
where Ψ and κ are the same constants as in the preceding sections. By comparing
equation (4.27) with (4.47) and (4.30) with (4.50), respectively, one obtains:
Proposition 4.7. The maximum attainable levels of growth and welfare in the mixed
funding scheme are independent of governments’ objective functions, i.e. g∗ = g∗,MF
and V ∗t = V
∗,MF
t .
The above proposition shows that not the distribution of governments’ objectives
is important in attaining the maximum outcome of the model in terms of growth
and welfare levels, but rather the existence of different government levels itself.
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4.5 Conclusions
In view of the opposing forces towards either fiscal decentralization or fiscal central-
ization, the effects of these forces on economic growth have been a major focus of
debate and discussion with respect to recent public policy reforms. While the em-
pirical literature on the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth is widely inconclusive, theoretical conjectures predominantly suggest a pos-
itive linkage. The aim of the present research is therefore to supplement the scarce
theoretical analysis on this topic in order to shed light on the theoretical linkage
of fiscal decentralization and growth, thereby trying to dissolve discrepancies of the
empirical findings.
Using a simple overlapping generations model with endogenous growth, two re-
gions and different layers of governments with conflicting objectives, the present
analysis not only reveals that there exists a growth maximizing degree of fiscal de-
centralization, but also that some degree of fiscal decentralization will always be
superior as compared to the cases of complete fiscal (de)centralization. The analysis
is carried out in the context of education funding, more specifically, three different
funding schemes are considered and their performance in terms of long-run growth
and welfare levels are compared.
The findings suggest that a mixed funding scheme, where the central government
subsidizes local educational spending and the extent of this financial assistance serves
as an indicator of fiscal decentralization, displays higher growth rates and welfare
levels than the alternative systems, where education is either financed exclusively by
the central or local governments. This is due to the fact that the central government
may counterbalance the suboptimal choice of the local tax rate from the growth-
maximizing perspective by promoting the degree of fiscal decentralization which
induces the local government to increase its own level of taxation, whereas growth
and welfare levels in the alternative funding systems are ultimately determined by
the local and central governments’s choice about the tax rate in order to maximize
local welfare levels.
Furthermore, there exists a growth-maximizing degree of fiscal decentralization
for the mixed funding scheme which turns out to be insufficient from the viewpoint
of a welfare maximizing local government. Consequently, the promotion of fiscal
decentralization may not only enhance growth for initially low levels of fiscal de-
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centralization but also lead to a welfare gain for local residents. Yet, the presence
of private educational spending increases the optimal degree of fiscal decentraliza-
tion as local public educational spending should be less subsidized by the central
government the more productive private spending is in fostering human capital ac-
cumulation.
Finally, for the mixed system, it is shown that maximum growth and welfare
levels may well be achieved by altering governments’ objectives, namely by assum-
ing growth-maximizing local governments and a short-sighted central government
caring about regional welfare. However, in this case, any degree of fiscal decentral-
ization between zero and one becomes optimal as local governments may counteract
any change in the degree of fiscal decentralization and thus the public educational
subsidy by adjusting the regional level of taxation, thereby rendering the central
governments education policy ineffective.
To sum up, the theoretical findings partly confirm Oate’s conjecture that fiscal
decentralization is conducive to higher growth, thereby yielding a second strong ar-
gument in favor of fiscal decentralization besides the well known efficiency argument.
This, however, only holds if the initial degree of fiscal decentralization is sufficiently
small. Furthermore, the existence of a growth maximizing degree of fiscal decentral-
ization may not only explain the opposing forces towards either decentralization or
centralization as well as the opposed empirical findings, but also points to the fact
that the theoretical linkage is not as clear cut as proposed by some previous stud-
ies. Consequently, policy implications have to be carefully balanced with respect to
possible advantages and disadvantages.
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